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ABSTRACT
The post-crisis financial services regulatory overhaul, and,
particularly, the creation of the European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS) and the Banking Union mechanisms, has
increased the complexity of the EU financial supervisory architecture.
In this new system, financial supervision is carried out by a network
of interconnected financial supervisors, with different mandates and
subject to various accountability structures, operating at both the
Member State and EU levels and bound by a regime of cooperation
duties. An efficient cooperation among and within the various
levels of this complex supervisory architecture is critical for the good
functioning of the EU financial system. This Article identifies and
analyzes key supervisory cooperation challenges in the single market
for financial services, and assesses whether the EU legal and
regulatory frameworks effectively address them. The Article argues
that, despite the advancement of EU financial services integration
and supervisory convergence that the post-crisis regulatory overhaul
has brought, there are important legal and regulatory obstacles to an
efficient supervisory cooperation in the European Union; these
source, primarily, from the following: first, the lack of clarity and
precision of the EU regime on supervisory cooperation duties;
second, the limited applicability of the ESFS’s mediation mechanisms
to supervisory cooperation disputes; and, third, the tensions between
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transnational mandates of financial supervision and national
accountability structures and mandates. The Article also examines the
threats that Brexit and the EU political crisis pose to EU financial
integration and supervisory cooperation.
Keywords: financial supervision, supervisory cooperation,
European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union, Brexit
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the European Union, supervisory responsibilities concerning
financial markets, institutions and the financial system are fragmented
among a number of competent supervisory authorities (“CSAs”) at
both the Member State and EU levels. 1 Owing to the cross-border
1. For an overview of the EU financial regulatory and supervisory architecture as well as
its main actors see generally, House of Lords European Union Committee (UK), The PostCrisis EU Financial Regulatory Framework: Do the Pieces Fit?, 5th Report of Session 201415, HL 103 (2015); FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS
(Eddy Wymeersch et al. eds., 2012). There is no single definition of CSAs but, generally, this
concept comprises “entities of a public nature with officially recognized authority to carry out
regulation and supervision of the financial sector–financial institutions, markets, and products–
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nature and implications of EU financial sector activities, 2 when CSAs
perform supervisory functions they often need to cooperate with and
assist each other; for example, the home CSA of a financial entity
may need information about the latter that can only be obtained
through cooperation of a host CSA in a Member State where such
entity is providing financial services. 3
An efficient financial supervisory cooperation framework is
essential for the good functioning of the single market for financial
services and, more generally, for fostering financial integration in the
European Union. 4 Without adequate supervisory cooperation, CSAs
may be unable to properly exercise their supervisory and enforcement
responsibilities, and to guarantee core targets of financial supervision,
such as the soundness of the financial markets, the stability of the
financial system and consumer protection. 5 Also, suboptimal levels of
cooperation between CSAs increase the risk of an inconsistent
application of EU law across the Member States, 6 and supervisory
arbitrage. 7
Before the global financial crisis, the rules and procedures on
supervisory cooperation in the European Union were, primarily,
in a given jurisdiction.” PABLO IGLESIAS-RODRÍGUEZ, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF FINANCIAL
REGULATORS: A EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (2014).
2. Despite the negative effects of the global financial crisis on international financial
flows, intra-EU capital flows are of major importance to the EU economy; for example, in the
year 2015, intra-EU Foreign Direct Investment inflows amounted to EURO 365 billion. See
Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the Movement of Capital and the
Freedom of Payments, SWD (2017) 94 final, at 14.
3. For examples of procedures applicable to supervisory cooperation requests in the
European Union see, e.g., Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/980 of 7 June
2017 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to standard forms, templates
and procedures for cooperation in supervisory activities, for on-site verifications, and
investigations and exchange of information between competent authorities in accordance with
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2017 O.J. L 148/3.
4. See, e.g., Commission, Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005 - 2010), COM
(2005) 177, at 10 [hereinafter Green Paper]; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 39-43 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design
in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 243, 246
(2010).
6. See, e.g., Takis Tridimas, EU Financial Regulation: From Harmonization to the Birth
of EU Federal Financial Law, in THE EUROPEAN UNION LEGAL ORDER AFTER LISBON 120
(Patrick Birkinshaw & Mike Varney eds., 2010).
7. Christopher P. Buttigieg, Governance of Securities Regulation and Supervision: Quo
Vadis Europa?, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 411, 425 (2015).
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Member State-based, and their scope was very narrow, excluding, for
instance, macro-prudential oversight. 8 Financial supervisory
responsibilities were distributed among Member State CSAs with
different structures, targets, mandates, and powers. 9 The role of the
European Union in the organization and coordination of supervisory
cooperation was very limited. 10 Although EU financial sector laws
acknowledged certain supervisory cooperation duties, 11 cooperation
was essentially articulated on the basis of non-binding agreements,
and CSAs from the Member States enjoyed ample margins of
discretion in deciding whether or not to cooperate with each other in
particular instances. 12 This resulted in inconsistent approaches to
supervisory cooperation across the European Union. 13
The crisis exposed the failures of such a nationally-based system
of financial supervision and supervisory cooperation. 14 The financial
services regulatory overhaul that followed, and, particularly, the
creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (“ESFS”)
8 . See, e.g., Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: A Reformed Financial Sector for Europe, COM (2014) 279 final, at 4.
9. See generally, Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe:
About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV 237 (2007).
10 . For example, the Lamfalussy Committees–which are explained in Section IV.B
below–played a role in the promotion of supervisory cooperation and convergence in the
European Union; however, they had limited powers and authority. See Eilis Ferran,
Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision, in
Wymeersch, supra note 1, at 118.
11. See, e.g., Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4
November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or
admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, recital 39, 2003 O.J. L 345/64;
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Directive 93/22/EEC, art. 56, 2004 O.J. L 145/1.
12 . See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN ET AL., CROSS-BORDER BANKING IN EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 5 (2011);
Jianping Zhou, Institutional Setup for the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union,
in FROM FRAGMENTATION TO FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 46 (Charles Enoch et al.
eds., 2014).
13. See, e.g., Huw Jones, UK bank lobby urges better watchdog cooperation, REUTERS
(Sept. 28, 2007), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-banks-regulator/mps-to-grill-ukwatchdog-over-scrapping-of-banking-culture-review-idUKKBN0UL0YS20160107
[https://
perma.cc/22DQ-7V5P] (archived Mar. 5, 2018).
14. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN
ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 69, 75 (2001).
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and the Banking Union mechanisms did introduce major changes to
the EU financial supervision architecture, including in matters
pertaining to supervisory cooperation. 15 In this new architecture, there
has been a transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the EU level; for
instance, EU institutions–such as the European Central Bank
(“ECB”)–and bodies–such as the European Supervisory Authorities
(“ESAs”)–are entrusted with direct supervision of certain areas of the
financial system, 16 and they also play a key role in the development of
rules on supervisory cooperation, 17 the creation of a common
supervisory culture, 18 and mediation between CSAs. 19
However, at the same time, the reforms of the EU financial
supervisory system have significantly increased the complexity of the
supervisory patchwork, which is composed of a network of
interconnected CSAs with different mandates and subject to various
accountability structures, operating at both the Member State and EU
levels and bound by a system of cooperation duties. This raises the
question of the role and limitations of EU law in dealing with such
complexity and guaranteeing an efficient supervisory cooperation
framework where CSAs are willing and able to cooperate with each
other. This Article analyzes the supervisory cooperation challenges
brought about by the complex and multi-level nature of the post-crisis
EU financial supervision architecture, and assesses whether these
challenges can be and are effectively addressed by the EU legal and
regulatory frameworks. In order to do so, the remainder of this Article
proceeds as follows.
Part II offers a concept and taxonomy of supervisory cooperation
that takes stock of the EU multi-level and transnational supervisory
relationships; this is followed by an examination of the determinants
of the incentives and ability of CSAs to cooperate in Part III. Part IV
charts and assesses the evolution of the supervisory cooperation
15. See infra, Part IV.
16. For an analysis of the use and implications of such direct supervisory powers see,
e.g., Elizabeth Howell, The Evolution of ESMA and Direct Supervision: are there Implications
for EU Supervisory Governance?, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1027 (2017).
17. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, Supervision in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, in
Wymeersch, supra note 1, at 101-02.
18. The ESAs play a key role in the promotion of supervisory convergence –for examples
of actions in this area, see, e.g., EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY,
SUPERVISORY CONVERGENCE: WORK PROGRAMME 2016 (2016).
19. See infra, Part VI.
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regime in the European Union, from the early days of the single
market for financial services until the present; this Part explains the
transformation of supervisory cooperation relationships resulting from
the creation of the ESFS and the Banking Union. Part V examines the
limits of and exceptions to supervisory cooperation duties embraced
by the EU constitutional and legal frameworks and evaluates whether
the process of EU financial integration and the increasing
harmonization of financial rules have narrowed the discretion of
CSAs from the Member States to withhold cooperation from other
fellow CSAs. Part VI studies the main mechanisms offered by the
post-crisis EU financial supervision architecture to address
cooperation disputes between CSAs, their scope, applicability and
potential impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate. Part VII
considers the nature of the mandates of CSAs within the ESFS and
the Banking Union and analyzes the potential tensions arising from
the coexistence of transnational (EU-wide) and national (Member
State) mandates of supervisory cooperation and of accountability
relationships. Part VIII offers some insights with respect to the threats
to EU financial integration and supervisory cooperation posed by
Brexit and the prospect of a multi-speed EU. Part IX summarizes the
main findings of this Article and concludes.
II. THE CONCEPT OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION AND ITS
APPLICATION TO EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: A WORKING
DEFINITION AND TAXONOMY
Cooperation is a relationship in which one or more parties
collaborate and/or assist each other in the performance of certain
tasks. 20 In the field of financial supervision, cooperation refers,
primarily, to the assistance provided among CSAs of the same or
different jurisdictions, with respect to supervisory matters, namely
licensing and authorization of financial entities, supervision stricto
sensu, sanctioning, and crisis management. 21
20. The Cambridge Dictionary defines cooperation as: “the act of working together with
someone or doing what they ask you”. Cooperation, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2007).
21. Rosa Lastra, Financial Institutions and Accountability Mechanisms, in BUILDING
RESPONSIVE AND RESPONSIBLE FINANCIAL REGULATORS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 34 (Iglesias-Rodríguez ed., 2015). CSAs perform both regulatory
and supervisory roles and, although cooperation may refer to any of these functions, this
Article focuses on the supervisory dimension of cooperation.
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The existence of and need for supervisory cooperation stems
from two main factors. First, supervisory responsibilities are
fragmented among CSAs along inter alia functional, 22 sectoral 23 and
jurisdictional dimensions. 24 Second, the nature and implications of the
activities of supervised financial entities often cut across one or more
supervisory dimensions; as a result, those activities may be subject to
oversight by various CSAs; 25 it follows that, when CSAs carry out
supervisory functions, they may often need to cooperate with each
other. A supervisory cooperation procedure involves two key actors,
namely a requesting CSA and a requested CSA. 26 A requesting CSA
will trigger a supervisory cooperation procedure when it needs
cooperation by a requested CSA; this will normally relate to instances
where, in order to exercise its supervisory functions, a requesting
CSA must access information that can only be obtained through the

22 . For instance, in jurisdictions that follow the twin-peaks model of financial
supervision, also known as supervision by objectives, different CSAs are in charge of different
objectives of financial supervision; this normally results in a CSA being responsible for
prudential supervision and another CSA carrying out conduct of business supervision, of all
sectors and entities in a given jurisdiction. See Wymeersch, supra note 9, at 258; GROUP OF
THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 13-14 (2008).
23. In the three-pillar/institutional model, the supervision –both prudential and conduct
of business– of banking, insurance and securities entities is carried out by different CSAs. In
this model, which is, for example, used in Spain, it is the activity and legal status of an entity
that determines the CSA that will supervise it. See Wymeersch, supra note 9, at 250-51; and,
Group of Thirty, supra note 22, at 24.
24. An example of a multi-level jurisdictional financial supervision architecture is the
ESFS in the European Union, where supervisory tasks are shared among EU bodies –e.g. the
ESAs– and CSAs from the Member States. See generally, Eddy Wymeersch, The Institutional
Reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System, an Interim Report (Ghent Univ. Fin.
Law Inst. Working Paper No. 2010-01, 2010).
25 . For example, ABN AMRO Bank N.V, a large Dutch banking institution, is
supervised by two Dutch CSAs, i.e. the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) –the
prudential supervisor–and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit
Financiële Markten)–the conduct of business supervisor–, as well as by one EU level CSA,
namely the ECB. See Regulators, ABN AMRO (Jan. 13, 2018, 9:19 PM),
https://www.abnamro.com/en/about-abnamro/our-company/corporategovernance/regulators/index.html [https://perma.cc/K3PJ-4W5T] (archived Mar. 20, 2018).
26. This is the terminology used by, inter alia, the European Securities and Markets
Authority Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Arrangements and
Exchange of Information (ESMA/2014/608), art. 1 [hereinafter ESMA MMoU], and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information
(2012), arts. 2-3 [hereinafter IOSCO MMoU].
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intervention of a requested CSA. 27 In this respect, a request may
pursue, either the performance of actions by a requested CSA, aimed
at acquiring and/or transmitting the relevant information, or the
granting of an authorization to a requesting CSA to directly perform
those actions–on its own, or jointly with the requested CSA; for
example, a requesting CSA may make a request targeted at either
gaining access to the offices of a financial entity in the jurisdiction of
a requested CSA, with the purpose of conducting a joint on-site
inspection with the requested CSA, or, alternatively, it may request
that a requested CSA carries out such an inspection on its behalf. 28
Whereas supervisory cooperation often involves an ex-ante ad hoc
request of assistance by a CSA, it may also be provided
spontaneously by another CSA; supervisory cooperation agreements
do, indeed, tend to embrace and encourage unsolicited assistance
among CSAs. 29
National cooperation takes place between CSAs from the same
jurisdiction; in the United Kingdom, two CSAs, namely the
Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”)–in charge of authorization
and prudential supervision of financial firms–and the Financial
Conduct Authority (“FCA”)–entrusted with conduct of business
supervision of financial firms– 30 have signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (“MoU”) that sets out mechanisms of cooperation, for
example, through the exchange of information between both CSAs.31
Likewise, CSAs engage in forms of multijurisdictional cooperation at
the international level. International cooperation is particularly
relevant in relation to the supervision of entities operating on a crossborder basis–for example, incorporated in a Member State but with
branches and/or subsidiaries in other Member States or outside the
27. For instance, a requested CSA may hold records of transactions executed in its
jurisdiction by a financial entity that is being investigated by the requesting CSA.
28. See, e.g., ESMA MMoU, supra note 26, art. 6.
29. For example, the IOSCO MMoU stipulates that: “Each Authority will make all
reasonable efforts to provide, without prior request, the other Authorities with any information
that it considers is likely to be of assistance to those other Authorities in securing compliance
with Laws and Regulations applicable in their jurisdiction.” IOSCO MMoU, supra note 26,
art. 13.
30. For a critical analysis of the creation and rationale of the PRA and the FCA, see Eilis
Ferran, The Break-up of the Financial Services Authority, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 455
(2011).
31. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Financial Conduct Authority and the
Bank of England, Including the Prudential Regulation Authority (Apr. 2013).
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European Union. 32 In the European Union, there is a coexistence of
forms of national cooperation, i.e. between the CSAs of each Member
State, or between EU level CSAs, 33 and of supranational cooperation,
i.e. between the EU CSAs and the Member State CSAs.
Without adequate cooperation arrangements and procedures in
place, CSAs may be unable to properly monitor and discipline firms
under their supervisory remit; this may, in turn, result in costs being
borne by investors and consumers of financial services. 34 As regards
systemic considerations, the global financial crisis evidenced that lack
of or insufficient cooperation in prevention as well as resolution
stages may also hinder the stability of the financial system. 35 An
efficient supervisory cooperation framework is therefore essential for
the accomplishment of key targets of financial supervision, such as
the sound functioning of the financial markets, the protection of
consumers of financial services and, ultimately, financial stability. 36
In the European Union, supervisory cooperation has been
acknowledged as a condition of financial integration; 37 consequently,
as the process of construction of the EU single market for financial
services advanced, policy-makers have been devoting greater degrees
of attention to how to enhance cooperation between CSAs within the
European Union. 38
32. Efficient supervisory cooperation has, indeed, been identified as a critical factor for
the smooth operation of the EU single passport for financial services. See, e.g., Committee of
European Securities Regulators, Protocol on the Supervision of Branches under MiFID
(CESR/07-672b), at 2.
33. Such as the ESAs.
34 . The inadequate cooperation between the Financial Services Authority (FSA) –a
former CSA in the UK–and the Bank of England with respect to Northern Rock –a banking
institution–, contributed to the latter’s collapse. See, e.g., House of Commons Treasury
Committee (UK), The Run on the Rock, 5th Report of Session 2007-08, HC 56-I (2008), at
156-60; Dirk Schoenmaker, Financial Supervision in the EU, in HANDBOOK OF
SAFEGUARDING GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND
ECONOMIC THEORIES AND MODELS 363 (Gerard Caprio ed., 2012).
35 . An example was the insufficient cooperation between CSAs from Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands with respect to Fortis’ liquidity crisis in the year 2008. See,
e.g., DIRK SCHOENMAKER, GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING: THE FINANCIAL
TRILEMMA 79-81 (2013).
36 . See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, PRINCIPLES REGARDING CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISORY
COOPERATION: FINAL REPORT 7-9 (2010)
37. See, e.g., Green Paper, supra note 4, at 10.
38. For example, the Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the
EU (the de Larosiére Report), published in the year 2009 as a response to the global financial
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Depending on the hierarchy of the CSAs involved in a given
supervisory cooperation procedure, it is possible to define instances of
horizontal or vertical cooperation. Horizontal cooperation refers to
cooperation between CSAs from the same or different jurisdictions,
operating at the same hierarchical level, or with different hierarchical
standing, but with respect to matters in which they have equal
authority or in relation to which supervisory authority is allocated
symmetrically; an example of this type of cooperation would be that
between a prudential CSA and a conduct of business CSA of the same
jurisdiction in relation to the activities of a financial entity under the
supervisory umbrella of both supervisors ; in the Netherlands , the
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (“AFM”) and De Nederlandsche Bank
(“DNB”)–respectively entrusted with conduct of business supervision
and prudential supervision of both financial institutions and pension
providers–articulate their cooperation through agreements that
embrace, inter alia, the exchange of information and supervisory
dialogues between both CSAs. 39 Vertical cooperation involves CSAs
from the same or different jurisdictions, operating at different
hierarchical levels or with the same hierarchical standing but with
respect to matters in which they have uneven authority; an example of
such a vertical cooperation relationship would be a supranational
CSA with exclusive competence on a given supervisory matter that
requests information to a national CSA–bound by cooperation duties
towards the supranational CSA–in relation to such matter; for
instance, in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (“SSM”) of the
Banking Union, the ECB is entrusted with the direct prudential
supervision of significant credit institutions in the Member States that
participate in the SSM, 40 and the CSAs from those Member States are

crisis, proposed several measures aimed at improving supervisory cooperation in the European
Union; the de Larosiére Report will be further explained in Section IV.C below. THE HIGHLEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU, REPORT (2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/J23R-MXBN] (archived Mar. 5, 2018) [hereinafter de Larosiére Report].
39. See, e.g., DNB, Covenant between Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten and De
Nederlandsche Bank N.V., https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Convenant%20AFM%20en%20DNB
%20%20Wta%20Wft%20Pw%20en%20Wvb_tcm46-156471.pdf
[https://perma.cc/246XUCXK] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
40. Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions,
art. 4.1, 2013 O.J. L 287/63 [hereinafter SSM Regulation].

600

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:589

bound by cooperation duties vis-à-vis the ECB in relation to the
latter’s exercise of such a direct competence.41
Cooperation may be requested and provided on the basis of
informal or formal mechanisms. The former include forms of
cooperation that do not abide by a particular set of pre-determined
rules; an example is an informal conversation between the heads of
two CSAs where they exchange views and/or information about a
given financial entity or supervisory process. 42 Formal mechanisms
comprise instruments of cooperation that follow pre-determined ad
hoc rules–binding or otherwise–applicable to a supervisory
cooperation relationship. Among the formal mechanisms, there is a
distinction between binding and non-binding mechanisms. Whereas
supervisory cooperation has traditionally been and still is largely
articulated through non-binding instruments, such as MoUs, 43
financial regulatory frameworks tend to acknowledge cooperation
duties that require CSAs to assist each other. 44 As will be shown
throughout this Article, in the European Union, the post-crisis
overhaul has strengthened the binding dimension of supervisory
cooperation through, among others, the expansion of supervisory
cooperation duties to which CSAs are subject.

41 . SSM Regulation, supra note 40, art. 6.2. On the issue of competence sharing
between the ECB and CSAs in the SSM, see Christos Gortsos, Competence Sharing Between
the ECB and the National Competent Supervisory Authorities Within the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 401 (2015).
42 . Informal mechanisms of supervisory cooperation, such as exchanges of letters
between CSAs, played an important role in the early stages of development of the EU single
market for financial services. See, e.g., Susanne Bergsträsser, Cooperation between
Supervisors, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE
AND BEYOND 380 (Guido Ferrarini ed.,1998).
43. MoUs are written, non-binding, bilateral or multilateral agreements that set rules
regarding exchange of information and cooperation between CSAs of the same or different
jurisdictions; the IOSCO has developed various standards regarding the content of MoUs –see
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES
COMMISSIONS, PRINCIPLES FOR MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING (1991).
44. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing
Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, art. 2.3, 2010 O.J. L 331/84.
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III. THE DETERMINANTS OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION:
THE INCENTIVES AND ABILITY OF CSAS TO COOPERATE
Despite the key instrumental role of supervisory cooperation for
the good functioning of financial markets and in advancing financial
integration, CSAs is the European Union have often failed to
efficiently cooperate with each other. In the opinion of the HighLevel Group on Financial Supervision in the European Union, the
pre-global financial crisis supervisory setting was characterized by a
“Lack of frankness and cooperation between supervisors” 45 that had
detrimental effects on the quality and promptness of the responses to
the financial meltdown: “As the crisis developed, in too many
instances supervisors in Member States were not prepared to discuss
with appropriate frankness and at an early stage the vulnerabilities of
financial institutions which they supervised. Information flow among
supervisors was far from being optimal, especially in the build-up
phase of the crisis. This has led to an erosion of mutual confidence
among supervisors.” 46
Suboptimal supervisory cooperation may adopt three main
forms. The first is lack of cooperation; this may happen, for instance,
when a CSA plainly rejects a request of cooperation. The second form
of suboptimal cooperation consists of incomplete cooperation, an
example being the provision of partial or insufficient information to a
fellow CSA. Third, there are instances of delayed cooperation. 47
Understanding the reasons why CSAs may engage in forms of
suboptimal cooperation is essential to assess whether and how EU law
adequately addresses this problem. Suboptimal levels of supervisory
cooperation can be traced to two core general causes, namely lack of
willingness and lack of ability of CSAs to cooperate.
On the one side, a CSA–e.g. a requested CSA from a Member
State– may lack willingness to cooperate, notably when the perceived
costs of cooperating with another CSA–e.g. a requesting CSA from
45. De Larosiére Report, supra note 38, at 41.
46. Id.
47. With regard to supervision of banking institutions, see Katia D’Hulster, Cross
Border Banking Supervision Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing between
Home and Host Supervisors, 12 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5871, 2011)
(“At an institutional level, the home supervisor may not report, or may misreport or delay
reporting supervisory information to the host supervisor, resulting in issues with regard to
timeliness and relevance of information shared in a college.”).
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another Member State– are higher than the benefits. The provision of
supervisory cooperation may, in the first place, result in costs for
supervised entities, financial markets and the financial system in the
jurisdiction of the CSA providing cooperation; for example, the
delivery of information about a supervised entity by a requested CSA
–e.g. a host supervisor–may lead to sanctions being imposed on such
entity by the requesting CSA–e.g. the home supervisor. In a
supervisory cooperation relationship the incentives of CSAs may be
misaligned, notably, when the economic and systemic relevance of a
supervised entity is different in the jurisdictions of the requested CSA
and of the requesting CSA, and, consequently, the actions resulting
from the provision of cooperation, such as the imposition of sanctions
to the supervised entity, have an asymmetrical impact in those
jurisdictions; for instance, in the early stages of the global financial
crisis, CSAs from various Member States adopted protectionist
supervisory approaches characterized by lack of cooperation in crisis
management, as well as ring-fencing practices aimed at prioritizing
the interests of their own financial institutions. 48 Henceforth, the
significance of a supervised entity in relation to which supervisory
cooperation is sought, as well as the potential impact of the provision
of such cooperation in the financial system under the supervisory
remit of a requested CSA, are key factors that will determine the
latter’s incentives to cooperate. 49 In addition, supervisory cooperation
is an intrinsically costly activity that requires the mobilization of time
and other resources, whose cost will also be considered by a CSA
when assessing the value of cooperation in a particular supervisory

48. Nicolas Véron, Banking Nationalism and the European Crisis: Oral remarks
prepared for a speech on the changing European financial system, given in Istanbul on 27
June 2013 at a symposium of the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association
(EVCA) (Oct. 19, 2013), http://bruegel.org/2013/10/banking-nationalism-and-the-europeancrisis/ [https://perma.cc/9VBC-J4TU] (archived Mar. 5, 2018); Dirk Schoenmaker, Banking
supervision and Resolution: The European Dimension, 6 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 52, 53 (2012).
On the misalignment of incentives between home and host supervisors, see generally,
Katharina Pistor, Host’s Dilemma: Rethinking EU Banking Regulation in Light of the Global
Crisis (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Finance Working Paper No. 286,
2010), http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id1631940
.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR5G-N7W3] (archived Mar. 5, 2018).
49. D’Hulster, supra note 47 (offering a detailed account of the impact of the economic
and systemic significance of supervised banking entities on the incentives of home and host
supervisors to cooperate).
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context. 50 However, lack of cooperation may also have negative
effects for a CSA withholding it. Notably, it may hinder supervisory
relationships with the CSA requesting or expecting cooperation. This
may, in turn, result in future costs for an uncooperative CSA–for
example if a CSA that has been denied cooperation behaves
reciprocally and refuses to provide cooperation in the future.
Likewise, a non-cooperative CSA may be subject to various forms of
accountability when, by not cooperating, it is deemed as having acted
against its duties and mandates. 51
On the other side, a CSA may face scenarios where it may be
willing to cooperate but is not able to do so. There may be two
primary reasons for this. The first is the presence of resource
constrains that hinder the ability of a CSA to meaningfully cooperate,
if at all. 52 The second relates to legal and regulatory constrains that
may preclude a CSA from offering cooperation. Legal and regulatory
constraints may fall within three main categories. First, rules
regarding supervisory cooperation may be absent or incomplete; this
would include cases in which the rules concerning the procedure for
supervisory cooperation are too vague and do not offer a precise
answer on how cooperation is to be organized in a particular
supervisory setting. Second, the legal framework in which a CSA
operates may embrace exceptions to the duty to cooperate that allow
and/or require a CSA to withhold cooperation in certain instances.53
Third, there may be cases in which there is a conflict between the
mandate of a CSA and compliance of the latter with a given request
of cooperation. 54
The EU regime of supervisory cooperation in the financial field
has experienced major transformations throughout the various stages
of development of the EU single market for financial services. The
successive reforms of such a regime have aimed at, inter alia,
fostering the incentives and ability of CSAs to cooperate as well as
financial integration. The next Part examines the evolution of the EU
50. See, e.g., Richard J. Herring, Conflicts between Home & Host Country Prudential
Supervisors, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL
REGULATION 212 (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2007).
51. But see D’Hulster, supra note 47, at 6 (noting that the accountability of CSAs for
lack of cooperation with foreign counterparts is very limited).
52. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 50, at 212.
53. See infra, Part V.
54. See infra, Part VII.
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regime on supervisory cooperation from the early days to the present;
it also addresses the reforms encompassed by the European System of
Financial Supervision and the Banking Union, which have radically
transformed the supervisory cooperation architecture in the European
Union.
IV. EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN
PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE EARLY BEGINNINGS TO THE POSTGLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS REGULATORY OVERHAUL
The evolution of the system of financial supervisory cooperation
in the European Union is linked to developments in EU financial
regulation as well as in the institutional architecture of EU financial
services supervision. This Part distinguishes three main periods of
development of the EU regime of financial supervisory cooperation,
and analyzes the nature and instruments of supervisory cooperation in
each of them. It also assesses whether and the extent to which
different forms of cooperation address the challenges relating to the
ability and willingness of CSAs from different Member States to
assist each other.
A. EU Financial Supervisory Cooperation in the Early Days
In the initial stages of construction of the EU single market for
financial services, which can be traced to the Treaty of Rome and
which received additional momentum in the year 1986 with the
adoption of the Single European Act, 55 cooperation was primarily
horizontal. This was, to a great extent, due to the decentralized nature
of the EU financial regulatory and supervisory architecture, which
was largely built through directives and based on the principles of

55. The Treaty of Rome embraced the notions of free movement of capital and services
as well as freedom of establishment; the Single European Act instituted a series of changes
aimed at, among others, completing the internal market. For an overview of the process of
creation of an internal market for financial services, see Sydney J. Key, Financial Integration
in the European Community, 5, 11-12 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 349, 1989); see also Caroline Bradley, 1992: The
Case of Financial Services, 12 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 124, 141 (1991); Manning Gilbert
Warren III, The European Union’s Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 181,
182 (1994).
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minimum harmonization 56 and mutual recognition as well as a
combination of home country control and host country supervision. 57
In such framework, there was an exclusive delegation of regulatory
and supervisory functions in the financial services field to CSAs of
the Member States, with no EU level independent authorities
performing or even coordinating those functions.
Second, cooperation was essentially two-sided and based on
separate bilateral agreements subscribed between CSAs of the
different Member States. This system somehow filled the lack of EU
level ad hoc formal instruments embracing and providing a common
multilateral framework for assistance among CSAs. As a
consequence, the system of cooperation was fragmented and
asymmetrical, largely dependent on the specific–non-harmonized–
content of bilateral agreements. 58
Third, cooperation was rather informal. This does not mean that
it was voluntary. On the contrary, EU laws in the financial realm
have, long since, recognized the binding character of cooperation
among CSAs. 59 However, those very same laws provided neither an
institutional framework nor precise substantive and procedural rules
on whose basis a system of mutual assistance among CSAs could be
built. EU Member States opted for implementing a system of
cooperation based on instruments that gave them substantial
56 . Under the minimum harmonization approach, EU financial laws provided core
common standards, giving, at the same time, room for some regulatory competition among the
EU Member States. See EILIS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 54 (2004).
57. See Commission, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the
Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 final, at 27-28 (June 1985); TOBIAS C.
HOSCHKA, CROSS-BORDER ENTRY IN EUROPEAN RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES 42-43 (1993).
Under this system, firms were authorized and subject to prudential regulation and supervision
by CSAs in their home Member State, and entitled to offer services in other (host) Member
States, which carried out ancillary regulation and supervision. See E. Waide Warner, “Mutual
Recognition” and Crossborder Financial Services in the European Community, 55 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (1992).
58. See id. For examples of these types of agreements see, for instance, the list of
bilateral cooperation agreements between the Spanish securities supervisor (the Comisión
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (“CNMV”)) and other Member State CSAs, see (MOUs)
International Agreements, https://www.cnmv.es/portal/legislacion/MOUS.aspx [https://
perma.cc/Y5PT-9XF2] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
59. See, e.g., Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating
regulations on insider dealing, art. 10, 1989 O.J. L 334/30 (stipulating that: “the competent
authorities in the Member States shall cooperate with each other whenever necessary for the
purpose of carrying out their duties…”).
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flexibility and discretion; two of such instruments were particularly
salient: informal exchanges and Memoranda of Understanding
(“MoUs”).
Informal exchanges of information constitute the most basic and
earliest form of cooperation among CSAs, and their use preceded the
first directives in the field of financial services. 60 In addition, this
mechanism was pre-eminent and, to a large degree, exclusive, before
cooperation was institutionalized through ad hoc formal instruments.
In practice, informal exchanges take place through meetings and
conversations among heads or senior staff of CSAs. They may also
adopt the form of goodwill sharing of documents. Informal exchanges
are not bound by given procedural rules specifying whether and how
information is to be disclosed and exchanged. 61
MoUs are formal but non-binding agreements aimed at
providing a general framework for cooperation between the signatory
CSAs. MoUs address aspects such as the scope of assistance and the
procedures applicable to a request of cooperation, as well as the
modes in which such cooperation is to be provided by the requested
CSA or the uses that the requesting CSA can make of the information
received. MoUs were the first instruments to set up common
substantive and procedural norms of supervisory cooperation. In the
early stages of the EU internal market for financial services MoUs
were bilateral.
In this period, financial firms and actors tended to operate,
primarily, on a national basis and their cross-border activities were
rather limited. This was, in part, due to the presence of barriers for
cross-border financial activities and capital flows. 62 Whereas the
Single European Act and the resulting legislative measures in the
financial sector, such as the Capital Liberalization Directive, 63 the

60. References to this early form of cooperation are provided by Jean-Luc Lépine, A
Response to Fedders “Waiver by Conduct”, 6 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MKT. L. 319 (1984).
61. They are, however, subject to compliance with the legal and regulatory frameworks
in the jurisdictions of the CSAs involved.
62. See Jean Dermine, European Banking Integration, Ten Years After, 6-7 (Insead
Working Paper No. 95/92/FIN, 1995).
63. Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67
of the Treaty, 1988 O.J. L 178/5.
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Second Banking Directive 64 or the Investment Services Directive, 65
all helped to remove some of the obstacles to cross-border financial
activities–notably, the introduction of a system of single passports
enabled financial market actors to move across jurisdictions more
easily–, 66 several barriers to cross-border capital flows persisted in the
European Union. 67 These barriers were detrimental to the creation of
a strong cooperation culture among CSAs. In addition, the very nature
of the main instruments of cooperation also posed some barriers to
effective cooperation; in this respect, both MoUs and informal
exchanges of information were not binding and, hence, they did not
impose formal obligations on CSAs. Moreover, as will be explained
in Part V, relevant EU legislation and MoUs executed between CSAs,
incorporated a series of waivers from the duty to cooperate that
allowed CSAs to withhold cooperation under certain conditions.
Lastly, the lack of common substantive and procedural EU rules
addressing cooperation arrangements led to a very fragmented
system 68 with high degrees of uncertainty as regards the rights and
duties of CSAs in cooperation relationships.
B. The Lamfalussy Architecture: Towards the Europeanization of
Financial Supervisory Cooperation
In the late 1990s CSAs of the Member States adopted various
institutional initiatives that led to a strengthening of the framework of
supervisory cooperation in the European Union. A major
development in this respect was the creation of the Forum of
European Securities Commissions (“FESCO”) by securities
64. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 1989 O.J. L 386/1.
65. Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the
securities field, 1993 O.J. L 141/27.
66. The single passport essentially meant that a financial entity authorized to operate in a
Member State was allowed to offer its services in other Member States without being subject
to additional authorization requirements in the latter. See Innes Fraser & Paul Monimer-Lee,
The EC Single Market in Financial Services, 3 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 92 (1993).
67. See Emiliano Grossman & Patrick Leblond, Financial Regulation in Europe: From
the Battle of the Systems to a Jacobinist EU, in CONSTRUCTING A POLICY-MAKING STATE?:
POLICY DYNAMICS IN THE EU 197 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 2012).
68. Commission, Communication on Financial Services: Implementing the framework
for financial markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232, at 13-14 [hereinafter Financial Services
Action Plan (“FSAP”)].
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supervisors of the Member States, Norway and Iceland in 1997. 69
Unlike insurance and banking supervisors, which had, long since, had
their own EU supervisory cooperation fora, namely, the Conference
of Supervisory Authorities of the Member States of the European
Union and the Groupe de Contact, respectively, 70 this was not the
case in the securities field. FESCO filled this important gap by
offering a space of debate and exchange of ideas among CSAs in
charge of securities supervision. 71 Another critical development was
the creation and adoption of the first formal, albeit non-binding,
multilateral instruments of supervisory cooperation within the
European Union. Notably, in the year 1997, the Conference of
Supervisory Authorities published the “Siena Protocol” 72 and, two
years later, FESCO adopted the Multilateral Memorandum of
Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance of
Securities Activities (“FESCO MoU”). 73 These instruments provided,
for the first time, common rules applicable to supervisory exchanges
in the European Union; in doing so, they contributed, substantially, to
the process of convergence in areas pertaining to supervisory
cooperation. 74

69. See Susanne Bergsträsser, Regulatory Implications of an Exchange Merger, in
CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF THE EURO: CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS, LISTED
COMPANIES AND REGULATION 294 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2002).
70. The Conference of Insurance Supervisors was originally set up in the year 1958; it
was composed of insurance CSAs from 15 EU Member States and three European Economic
Area (“EEA”) countries. The Groupe de Contact was established in the year 1972 by banking
CSAs from EEA countries. See Karel Lannoo, Supervising the European Financial System, 17,
19 (Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief No. 21, 2002).
71. Id. at 9.
72. Protocol relating to the collaboration of the supervisory authorities of the Member
States of the European Community in particular in the application of the Directives on life
assurance and non-life insurance (DT/F/182/97). The Siena Protocol is a multilateral
agreement of cooperation which addresses, inter alia, the responsibilities of home and host
CSAs in supervisory processes. See Nina Moss, The International Network of Financial
Authorities, in HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL AUTHORITIES IN EUROPE:
NEW ARCHITECTURES IN THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 388 (Donato
Masciandaro ed., 2005).
73. The FESCO MoU was adopted on January 26, 1999 and its aim was: “to establish a
general framework for cooperation and consultation between the Authorities referred to
hereinafter, in order to facilitate the fulfilling of their supervisory responsibilities.”
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance
of Securities Activities (Jan. 26, 1999), art. 1 [hereinafter FESCO MoU].
74. See Ferran, supra note 56, at 47.
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The Member State-nature of the first EU-wide supervisory
cooperation arrangements was, to a great extent, the result of the
reluctance of the Commission to develop EU level supervisory
structures and mechanisms. For instance, in its Communication:
Financial Services: Building a framework for action, while
highlighting the importance of encouraging a closer coordination
between CSAs 75 the Commission argued that: “structured cooperation between national supervisory bodies–rather than the
creation of new EU level arrangements–can be sufficient to ensure
financial stability”. 76 Whereas the Commission’s Financial Services
Action Plan (“FSAP”), published in the year 1999, 77 acknowledged
the feasibility of future proposals for an EU single securities
supervisor, 78 it nevertheless advocated for the development of
supervisory arrangements based on the existing multilateral Member
State-driven structures, 79 rather than the creation of EU level ones.
The idea of institutionalizing supervisory cooperation arrangements
within ad hoc EU level structures was first proposed by the Final
Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (“Lamfalussy Report”), published in the year
2001. 80 In this respect, the Lamfalussy Report proposed the creation
of an EU Securities Regulators Committee (“ESRC”), which would
take over the functions of FESCO but with an official EU status–as an
advisory body to the Commission–and a broader mandate. 81 This
recommendation materialized in the creation of the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) by the Commission in the

75 . Commission, Communication on Financial Services: Building a framework for
action, COM (1998) 625 final, at 5.
76. Id. at 2.
77. See FSAP, supra note 68.
78. Id. at 14.
79 . Such as the Groupe de Contact, the Conference of Insurance Supervisors and
FESCO. Id.
80. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN
ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Lamfalussy Report]. Such a report was preceded by an initial report by the same group. See
THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, INITIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON THE
REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (Nov. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Initial
Lamfalussy Report]. The Lamfalussy Group operated under a mandate from the ECOFIN. See
id. at 1, 70.
81. Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 33-38.
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year 2001. 82 This was followed by the establishment of its
counterparts in the banking and insurance fields, namely the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (“CEBS”) and the
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors (“CEIOPS”), respectively, in the year 2003. 83 The
mandate of the Lamfalussy Committees was twofold. First, they were
entrusted with the promotion of regulatory and supervisory
consistency and convergence in the field of financial services in the
European Union; 84 their tasks in this area included advising the
Commission on policy issues as well as implementing measures,
issuing non-binding guidelines, standards and recommendations
targeted at furthering the uniform implementation and consistent
application of EU financial laws by the Member States, and
developing mechanisms aimed at fostering a consistent supervision
and enforcement across the European Union. 85 Another core function
of the Lamfalussy Committees was to enhance supervisory
cooperation among CSAs; 86 their work in this field was extensive and
included the development of guidelines on supervisory cooperation, 87
the creation of multilateral instruments of cooperation, such as

82. Commission Decision 2001/527/EC of 6 June 2001 establishing the Committee of
European Securities Regulators, 2001 O.J. L 191/45.
83. Commission Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee
of European Banking Supervisors, 2004 O.J. L 3/28; Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of 5
November 2003 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors, 2004 O.J. L 3/30. The CESR, CEBS and CEIOPS will be collectively referred to
as “Lamfalussy Committees”.
84 . See, e.g., CESR, Charter of the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR/08-375d), art. 4 [hereinafter Charter of the CESR]; Commission Decision 2004/5/EC,
supra note 83, art. 2.
85. Commission Decision 2001/527/EC, supra note 82, art. 2; Commission Decision
2004/5/EC, supra note 83, art. 2; Commission Decision 2004/6/EC, supra note 83, art. 2;
Charter of the CESR, supra note 84, art. 4; CEBS, Charter of the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors, art. 4 [hereinafter Charter of the CEBS]; and CEIOPS, Charter of the
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, art. 4 [hereinafter
Charter of the CEIOPS].
86 . See, e.g, Commission Decision 2004/5/EC, supra note 83, art. 2; Commission
Decision 2004/6/EC, supra note 83; Charter of the CESR, supra note 84, art. 4.4; Charter of
the CEBS, supra note 85.
87.
See,
e.g.,
CEBS,
Guidelines for Cooperation Between Consolidating
Supervisors and Host Supervisors
(2006),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/
16094/GL09.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDJ9-BCGN] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
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MoUs, 88 as well as the operation of mechanisms of mediation
between CSAs; 89 the latter gave the Lamfalussy Committees an
important, albeit non-binding, 90 mediation role in the solution of
supervisory cooperation disputes between CSAs. The Lamfalussy
Committees also took a close interest in and encouraged the work of
colleges of supervisors 91–which CSAs had been establishing since the
early 2000s–, 92 for example by developing common principles
applicable to supervision within supervisory colleges, including in
matters pertaining to supervisory cooperation. 93
Whereas the supervisory architecture embraced by the
Lamfalussy Committees did not entail a transfer of powers from the
Member State level to the EU level, 94 it did however result in a
greater centralization of (quasi) supervisory functions in the latter.
Particularly, the Commission’s recast of the decisions setting the
CESR, the CEBS and the CEIOPS in the year 2009, broadened their
remit so as to “strengthen their contributions to supervisory
cooperation and convergence”. 95 Cooperation largely remained,
88. See, e.g., CESR, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of
Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities (CESR/05-335) [hereinafter CESR
MoU].
89 . See, e.g., CEIOPS, Protocol on Mediation Mechanism between Insurance and
Pensions Supervisors (2007).
90 . See, e.g., CEBS, Protocol of the CEBS Mediation Mechanism (2007), art. 5
(“Mediation outcomes shall not have any legal effect, be legally binding or be enforceable.”),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16094/ProtocolonMediation20070925.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9HD-DMN2] (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
91. These are collegiate structures carrying out supervision of specific market actors –
such as banks–that operate on a cross-border basis; supervisory colleges are made of CSAs
from the jurisdictions responsible for and participating in the supervision of those cross-border
entities. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES 1 (2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs287.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5BMQ-5ANR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
92 . See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on the Coordination, Supervision and
Oversight of the Euronext Group (Mar. 2001) (Signing parties included the Authority for the
Financial Markets (the Netherlands), the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (France), the
Banking Finance and Insurance Commission (Belgium), and the Comissão do Mercado de
Valores Mobiliarios (Portugal)).
93. See, e.g., CEBS and CEIOPS, Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles
(CEIOPS-SEC-54/08), (CEBS 2008 124), IWCFC 08 32 (2009).
94. Rosa Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in
Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 59 (2003).
95 . See Commission Decision 2009/77/EC of 23 January 2009 establishing the
Committee of European Securities Regulators, recital 6, 2009 O.J. L 25/18; Commission
Decision 2009/78/EC of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Banking
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nonetheless, a Member State matter, but with the European Union
taking a much more active and formal role in the coordination of
assistance among CSAs.
The FSAP proposed a series of legislative measures that–jointly
with the introduction of the Euro–boosted the process of financial
integration and cross-border flows in the European Union, 96 creating
deeper interconnectedness between the financial systems of the
Member States and increasing the need for supervisory cooperation
among CSAs. 97 Despite this, such cooperation faced important
barriers. The financial supervisory patchwork in the European Union
was highly fragmented among CSAs with very different mandates,
objectives and powers. 98 In addition, as referred above, the EU level
supervisory arrangements encompassed by the Lamfalussy
architecture were limited in scope and non-binding.
C. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Transformation of the
EU Financial Supervisory Cooperation Architecture
The global financial crisis exposed important flaws of the precrisis financial architecture in the European Union, and the limitations
of a nationally-based supervisory system; these were acknowledged
by the Commission in its Communication on European Financial
Supervision published in the early stages of the financial crisis:
“Current supervisory arrangements proved incapable of preventing,
managing and resolving the crisis. Nationally based supervisory
models have lagged behind the integrated and interconnected reality
of today’s European financial markets, in which many financial firms
operate across borders. The crisis exposed serious failings in the
cooperation, coordination, consistency and trust between national
supervisors.” 99 The roots of the reform leading to the post-crisis EU
Supervisors, recital 6, 2009 O.J. L 25/23; Commission Decision 2009/79/EC of 23 January
2009 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors, recital 6, 2009 O.J. L 25/28.
96. Elias Papaioannou, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan & Jose-Luis Peydró, What is it good for?
Absolutely for financial integration, VOX (June 20, 2009), http://voxeu.org/article/euro-sfinancial-integration-europe [https://perma.cc/YMQ3-DYQR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
97 . CESR, Which Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities Markets? Preliminary
Progress Report (04-333f), at 8 [hereinafter Himalaya Report].
98. Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 15-16; Himalaya Report, supra note 97, at 18.
99. Commission, Communication from the Commission: European Financial
Supervision, COM (2009) 252 final, at 2.

2018] SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN SINGLE MARKET

613

financial supervision architecture can be traced to the Report of the
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (“de Larosiére
Report”), published in the year 2009. 100 The High-Level Group was
set up in the year 2008 by the Commission, which entrusted it with
the formulation of recommendations about supervisory arrangements
aimed at increasing the efficiency, integration and sustainability of
financial supervision in the European Union. 101 According to the de
Larosiére Report, the weaknesses of the EU pre-crisis system of
financial supervision 102 sourced from, inter alia, the lack of an EU
macro-prudential supervisor, 103 the flaws and inefficiencies of the
cooperation arrangements between CSAs at the Member State
level, 104 as well as the limited resources and powers of the
Lamfalussy Committees. 105 The de Larosiére High-Level Group made
proposals for the creation of a decentralized, but integrated and
coordinated structure of financial supervision that would comprise
new EU level macro and micro-prudential financial supervisors as
well as the CSAs of the Member States. 106 These proposals were
supported by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council and
resulted in the creation of a European System of Financial
Supervision (“ESFS”) in the year 2010. 107 The ESFS is a network
made of three pillars, each with its own institutional structures of
financial regulation and supervision that operate in a coordinated
manner, in charge of supervising the EU financial system. 108
The first pillar relates to EU-wide systemic risk supervision.109
This is carried out by a European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”),110
which performs macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial
system, with the primary aim of preventing and mitigating systemic
100. See de Larosiére Report, supra note 38.
101. Commission Press Release, IP/08/1679 (Nov. 11, 2008).
102. De Larosiére Report, supra note 38, at 38-58.
103. Id. at 39-40.
104. Id. at 40-41.
105. Id. at 41-42.
106. Id. at 4, 46-48.
107. Council of the European Union Press Release, 16369/10, 18-19 (Nov. 17, 2010).
108. See Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system
and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, recital 14, art. 1.2, 2010 O.J. L 331/1
[hereinafter ESRB Regulation].
109. Commission, COM (2009) 252 final, supra note 99, at 3.
110. See ESRB Regulation, supra note 108.
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risk, 111 issuing, where necessary, warnings and recommendations
addressed to the European Union, its Member States, the European
Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”), or CSAs. 112
The second pillar concerns micro-prudential regulation and
supervision at the EU level. 113 This task is performed by three EU
agencies, namely the European Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”).114
The ESAs are organized along sectoral lines and comprise the
European Banking Authority (“EBA”), 115 the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), 116 and the European
Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”). 117 The ESAs carry out
important quasi-regulatory and supervisory functions. 118 On the
rulemaking front, the ESAs develop guidelines and recommendations
addressed to CSAs or financial market participants and targeted at,
inter alia, promoting regulatory and supervisory convergence within
the ESFS; 119 they also contribute to building a single rulebook for the
EU financial markets through the creation of draft regulatory and
implementing standards 120 that develop technical aspects of EU
111. ESRB Regulation, supra note 108, art. 3.1.
112. Id. art. 16.2.
113. Commission, COM (2009) 252 final, supra note 99, at 3.
114. See Iglesias-Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 193-96. The ESAs were instituted by three
Regulations –see infra notes 115, 116 and 117– which will be collectively referred to as
“ESAs Regulations”.
115. The EBA was instituted by Regulation. See Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC
and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 2010 O.J. L 331/12 [hereinafter EBA
Regulation],
116. The EIOPA was instituted by Regulation. See Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending
Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, 2010 O.J. L
331/48 [hereinafter EIOPA Regulation].
117. The ESMA was instituted by Regulation. See Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No.
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, 2010 O.J. L 331/84
[hereinafter ESMA Regulation].
118. Eddy Wymeersch, The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs, in
Wymeersch et al., supra note 1.
119. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art 16.1.
120. Whereas the ESAs are entrusted with the drafting of technical standards, these are
submitted to the Commission for consideration and approval through Regulations or
Decisions. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 10.1, 10.4, 15.1, 15.4; Consolidated
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financial sector laws. 121 On the supervisory side, the ESAs monitor
and assess market developments as well as their potential impact on
financial market participants, providing, where necessary,
recommendations aimed at preventing or remedying risks and
vulnerabilities. 122 They are also entrusted with the development of a
common supervisory culture in the European Union through actions
that range from participating in the creation of uniform supervisory
standards to promoting cooperation between CSAs. 123 An important
difference between the Lamfalussy Committees and the ESAs is that,
unlike the former, the latter do have binding supervisory and
enforcement powers. For example, in cases of disagreements between
CSAs, the ESAs may settle the dispute through a binding decision
requiring the CSAs concerned to adopt or refrain from certain
actions. 124 Moreover, the ESAs may adopt temporary bans or
restrictions on certain financial products or activities which pose a
threat to the “ . . . orderly functioning and integrity of financial
markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in
the Union . . . . ” 125 In addition, the ESAs have been given direct
supervisory powers with respect to certain areas of the financial
system; this is the case of credit rating agencies and trade repositories,
which are directly supervised by ESMA, 126 and, in relation to which,
the latter may impose fines 127 or withdraw registration. 128 The second
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 290-291, 2012 O.J. C
326/47.
121. See, e.g., ESMA Regulation, supra note 117, recitals 5, 22; EBA Regulation, supra
note 115, recitals 5, 22.
122. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 32.
123. Id. art 29.
124. Id. art. 19.
125. Id. art. 9.5. For instance, Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending
Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012, arts. 40-41, 2014 O.J. L 173/84 [hereinafter Markets in
Financial Instruments Regulation (“MiFIR”)], respectively enable the ESMA and the EBA to
adopt such prohibitions or restrictions.
126. Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies, Title III, 2009 O.J. L 302/1; Regulation (EU) No.
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives,
central counterparties and trade repositories, Title IV, 2012 O.J. L 201/1 [hereinafter European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”)].
127. With respect to credit rating agencies, see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
No. 946/2012 of 12 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European
Parliament and of the Council with regard to rules of procedure on fines imposed to credit

616

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:589

pillar incorporates a forum of cooperation between the three ESAs,
the Joint Committee, whose purpose is to ensure cross-sectoral
consistency in regulation and supervision. 129
The third pillar regards the day-to-day macro-prudential and
micro-prudential regulation, supervision and enforcement activities
relating to markets and institutions at the Member State level. This is
assigned to the CSAs from each jurisdiction. 130 The ESFS attributes a
central role to cooperation among its various levels. As will be further
explained below, this is reflected in, among others, the configuration
of a detailed regime of cooperation duties among the constituents of
the ESFS.
The economic downturn that followed the financial crisis
evidenced the close connections between banking crises and
sovereign debt risk, 131 as well as the dangers of spill over effects
resulting from the latter within the euro area. 132 The Commission
responded by proposing a Banking Union that would provide a
system of common supervision, deposit protection, crisis management
and resolution of banks in the European Union. 133 This eventually
materialized in the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism
(“SSM”) in the year 2013, 134 of a Single Resolution Mechanism
rating agencies by the European Securities and Markets Authority, including rules on the right
of defence and temporal provisions, 2012 O.J. L 282/23.
128. See EMIR, supra note 126, recital 74, art. 73.
129. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 2.2(e), 54.
130. See, e.g., ESMA Regulation, supra note 117, recital 9; ESAs Regulations, supra
note 114, art. 2.2(f).
131. On the relationship between both, see Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt
Crisis, 26 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 59 (2012).
132. On this topic, see Roberto A. De Santis, The Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis. Safe
Haven, Credit Rating Agencies and the Spread of the Fever from Greece, Ireland and Portugal
(European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1419, 2012); Bertrand Candelon, Amadou N. Sy,
& Rabah Arezki, Sovereign Rating News and Financial Markets Spillovers: Evidence from the
European Debt Crisis (International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 11/68, 2011).
133. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, COM (2012) 510 final.
134. The SSM was instituted by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October
2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to
the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 2013 O.J. L 287/63 [hereinafter SSM
Regulation] and Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of
specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No.
1024/2013, 2013 O.J. L 287/5.
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(“SRM”) in the year 2014, 135 as well as in the formulation of
proposals for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (“EDIS”) in the
year 2015. 136 In the Banking Union, supervision is assigned to the
SSM, which is a supervisory system made of the ECB and relevant
CSAs of the Member States. 137 The SSM gives the ECB a preeminent role in the post-crisis EU financial architecture by entrusting
it with the direct prudential supervision of significant credit
institutions138 in the Eurozone and in other Member States that decide
to join the SSM. 139 CSAs remain responsible for the conduct of
business supervision as well as the direct prudential supervision of
less significant banks. 140
Both the ESFS and the Banking Union represent a shift from a
system of fully decentralized supervision, primarily conducted at the
Member State level and organized through cooperation agreements
between CSAs, towards a system of greater centralization of
supervisory functions at the EU level, while remaining, nonetheless, a
decentralized system with multiple supervisory actors. Such
centralization has two main dimensions. First, in the new framework,
there has been a transfer of direct supervisory responsibilities from
the Member State to the EU level. For example, as indicated above, in
the ESFS, the ESMA has direct supervision powers with respect to
credit rating agencies and trade repositories. In the SSM, the ECB
exercises direct prudential supervision of credit institutions
throughout the European Union. 141 Second, in the post-crisis EU
financial services architecture, EU entities, such as the ESAs, have
135. The SRM was instituted by Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform
procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, 2014 O.J. L 225/1 [hereinafter SRM Regulation].
136. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, COM
(2015) 586 final.
137. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art. 2.
138. Id. art. 6.4 (Whether a credit institution is significant or not depends on a set of
criteria related to: “(i) size; (ii) importance for the economy of the Union or any participating
Member State; and (iii) significance of cross-border activities.”).
139. Id. art. 4 (This includes the authorization and withdrawal of authorization of credit
institutions).
140. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, ECB BANKING SUPERVISION AND
BEYOND 59 (2014).
141. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, recital 15.
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assumed important responsibilities in the coordination of financial
supervision EU-wide; an example are emergency situations in which
there are developments that “may seriously jeopardise the orderly
functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the
whole or part of the financial system in the Union”; in those cases, the
ESAs are entrusted with the facilitation and, even the coordination, of
actions by CSAs of the Member States. 142 In addition, the ESFS
confers on the ESAs the task of “…promoting and monitoring the
efficient, effective and consistent functioning of the colleges of
supervisors . . . . ” 143
The creation of the ESFS and the Banking Union, and the
distribution of supervisory responsibilities within them to various
actors along sectoral and functional lines have resulted in a
multiplication of supervisory cooperation relationships. In the new
setting, the performance of supervisory tasks by an authority
operating in a given supervisory level–e.g. European Union or
Member State–may require the cooperation of other authorities in the
same or other levels. Moreover, certain supervisory actions are
entrusted to various authorities. The post-crisis supervisory patchwork
embraces three types of cooperation relationships. In the first place,
supervisory cooperation applies to the relationship between the
various pillars within both the ESFS and the Banking Union; for
example, the initiation and coordination of stress tests to assess the
resilience of financial market participants is jointly performed by and
requires cooperation between the ESAs and the ESRB. 144 Likewise, in
the SSM, the performance of tasks relating to consumer protection
and anti-money laundering require cooperation between the ECB and
Member State CSAs. 145 Second, there is a need for cooperation within
each of the pillars of the ESFS and of the Banking Union; for
example, the ESFS envisages cooperation between the ESAs in
relation to, inter alia, financial conglomerates and cross-sectoral
matters. 146 Third, supervisory cooperation also takes place between
the ESFS and the Banking Union bodies, notably, with respect to
142. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 18.1.
143. EIOPA Regulation, supra note 116, recital 35; ESMA Regulation, supra note 117,
recital 36; EBA Regulation, supra note 115, recital 36.
144. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 32.
145. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, recital 29.
146. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 54.2.
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matters of joint interest, and institutions operating across sectors.147
The change in the nature of supervisory relationships has led to a
redefinition of the EU regime of supervisory cooperation duties. The
latter includes forms of both horizontal and vertical cooperation.
On the one side, the general cooperation duties within the ESFS
and the SSM encompass a notion of horizontal cooperation between
their various constituent levels. With regard to the ESFS, the ESAs
Regulations stipulate that: “In accordance with the principle of
sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European
Union, the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full
mutual respect, in particular in ensuring the flow of appropriate and
reliable information between them.” 148 The SSM Regulation also
implements a model of horizontal cooperation, between the ECB and
the Member State CSAs: “Both the ECB and national competent
authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and
an obligation to exchange information.” 149
In specific supervisory contexts, the relationship between
different authorities is hierarchical and asymmetrical, giving rise to
forms of vertical cooperation that embrace ascendancy of some
supervisors over others. This is particularly the case in certain
relationships between the EU supervisory authorities and the Member
State CSAs. For example, the general duties pertaining to exchange of
information in the ESFS require that the CSAs of the Member States
provide the ESAs information relevant to their supervisory functions,
without establishing a corresponding duty for the ESAs:
At the request of the Authority [an ESA], the competent
authorities of the Member States shall provide the Authority with
all the necessary information to carry out the duties assigned to
it… Upon a duly justified request from a competent authority of
a Member State, the Authority may provide any information that
is necessary to enable the competent authority to carry out its
duties… 150

The asymmetrical position of financial supervisors at the EU and
Member State levels, respectively, is patent in areas where the former
147. See, e.g., SSM Regulation, supra note 134, recital 31.
148. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 2.4.
149. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art. 6.2.
150. See, e.g., ESMA Regulation, supra note 117, art. 35; EIOPA Regulation, supra note
116, art. 35.
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have direct supervisory powers; for example, in the SSM, the ECB
may, in the exercise of its direct supervisory powers, issue
instructions addressed to CSAs. 151
Both the ESFS and the Banking Union largely internalize the
process of regulatory coordination on matters pertaining to
supervisory cooperation through the creation of institutional
mechanisms of joint decision-making led by CSAs from the Member
States. For instance, the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors, whose voting
members are the heads of the Member State CSAs, 152 are the main
decision-making bodies of the ESAs and their powers include the
adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines and
recommendations. 153 Likewise, in the SSM, the formulation of
rulemaking and supervisory decisions is entrusted to a Supervisory
Board 154 where most decision-making power rests in representatives
of the Member State CSAs. 155 This Member State-based governance
structure 156 facilitates the debate and exchange of ideas among
national authorities on matters pertaining to financial regulation and
supervision, as well as to supervisory cooperation rules and processes,
and, consequently, may contribute to foster the legitimacy of the
latter. On the one side, from an input-legitimacy viewpoint, the joint
decision-making process enables the engagement of all the CSAs
affected by and subject to EU-wide supervisory cooperation rules and
151. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art. 6.3.
152. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 40.1(b).
153. Id. arts. 43.1-2.
154. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art 26.1.
155. Id. (The Supervisory Board is composed of a Chair, a Vice-Chair, four
representatives of the ECB and representatives of the CSAs in each participating Member
State).
156. Within it, the ESAs have been delegated powers for the development of norms
applicable to supervisory cooperation among CSAs at the Member State level. For instance,
under Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive
2011/61/EU, art. 80.4, 2014 O.J. L 173/349 [hereinafter MiFID II], the ESMA has been
delegated the adoption of draft implementing technical standards on “standard forms,
templates and procedures for competent authorities to cooperate in supervisory activities, onsite verifications, and investigations.” See also ESMA, Final Report. Draft implementing
technical standards under MiFID II (ESMA/2015/1858), at 29-30; ESMA, Draft Implementing
Technical Standards on forms and procedures for cooperation between competent authorities
under Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 on market abuse (ESMA70-145-100) (developing a
comprehensive framework of supervisory cooperation among the various CSAs and levels of
the ESFS in the field of market abuse).
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policies, in their creation; moreover, the adoption of decisions
regarding supervisory cooperation rules and processes often requires
qualified majority within the ESAs and the ECB, 157 and, hence,
greater degrees of consensus among the Member State CSAs. On the
other side, as regards output-legitimacy, the meetings of the Boards of
Supervisors of the ESAs and of the Supervisory Board of the ECB
operate as fora of transnational dialogue where CSAs can devise,
together, supervisory cooperation policies tailored to their needs and
expectations; this, in turn, may promote the acceptance of those
policies among the CSAs concerned and further the effective
functioning of financial sector supervisory cooperation in the
European Union.
The post-crisis EU financial services supervision architecture
examined in this Part represents a shift towards a model of greater
centralization and coordination of financial supervision, with potential
benefits for the convergence, consistency and legitimacy of
supervisory cooperation rules and procedures. 158 However,
contemporarily, the model of centralized decentralization embraced
by the ESFS and the Banking Union has substantially increased the
complexity of the EU financial supervisory patchwork, which is now
composed of a number of CSAs operating at various functional and
jurisdictional levels and bound by a heterogeneous system of
supervisory cooperation duties. This raises the question of whether
157. For instance, the adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines and
recommendations by the ESAs requires a qualified majority of the voting members of their
Boards of Supervisors. See EBA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European
Banking Authority Board of Supervisors (EBA/DC/2011/001, Rev 4), art. 3.5; EIOPA,
Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority Board of Supervisors (EIOPA-BoS-11/002, Rev3), art. 4.2; ESMA,
Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Securities and Markets Authority
Board of Supervisors (ESMA/2012/BS/88, Rev3), art. 4.4. Also, in the SSM, the Supervisory
Board takes decisions on draft regulations, which are used to develop important aspects of
supervisory cooperation within the SSM – see, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of the
European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within
the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national
competent authorities and with national designated authorities –, by qualified majority of its
members – see ECB, Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Board of the European Central
Bank (2014), art. 6.5; SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art. 26.7 .
158 . Indeed, stakeholders seem to acknowledge that the creation of the ESAs has
generally improved cooperation between CSAs. See European Parliament, Review of the New
European System of Financial Supervision, Part 1: The Work of the European Supervisory
Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) (IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-23), at 143.
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and how EU law is able to deal with such complexity and guarantee
the effective functioning of supervisory cooperation. In order to
answer this question the next Parts of this Article examine and assess
key legal, regulatory and institutional aspects of the post-crisis EU
financial supervisory cooperation architecture, their impact on the
ability and incentives of CSAs to cooperate with each other as well as
their contribution to the process of development of a single market for
financial services.
V. SUPERVISORY COOPERATION DUTIES AND THEIR LIMITS:
THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES’ DISCRETION
Cooperation duties are not unconditional. From the outset, EU
instruments have embraced limitations to the duty to cooperate which
give CSAs certain degrees of discretion as regards the decision
whether or not to cooperate in specific scenarios. The regime
concerning waivers from supervisory cooperation has been
particularly developed in the securities field, notably by the ESMA’s
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation
Arrangements and Exchange of Information (“ESMA MMoU”), 159
which contains detailed rules and procedures regarding cooperation
among CSAs and between CSAs and the ESMA. According to the
ESMA MMoU, there are three reasons that may justify a refusal to
cooperate by a requested CSA. 160
The first is that the request of cooperation falls outside the scope
of the ESMA MMoU. 161 This would, however, be a highly unlikely
scenario, first and foremost because the ESMA MMoU offers a rather
comprehensive list of potential areas and modes of cooperation. 162 In
addition, the wording of the ESMA MMoU leaves an open door to the
inclusion of areas and forms of cooperation not expressly addressed
by it; for instance, when referring to the subject-matter of
cooperation, the ESMA MMoU stipulates that: “assistance includes
but is not limited to matters relating to . . . ”; 163 likewise, with respect
to the forms of cooperation, the ESMA MMoU establishes that: “The
159. See generally, ESMA MMoU, supra note 26.
160. Id. art. 3.4.
161. Id. art. 3.4(a).
162. See, e.g., id. arts. 3.2-3.
163. Id. art. 3.2.
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scope of assistance available from the Requested Authority shall
include, inter alia . . . ” 164 In any event, a refusal to cooperate based
on the above-mentioned justification, would only apply to requests of
cooperation grounded on the ESMA MMoU. Therefore, a requested
CSA may be entitled to withhold cooperation under the ESMA
MMoU and, yet, be required to provide cooperation, if it is compelled
to do so by EU or national laws.
The second reason that may warrant the withholding of
cooperation by a requested CSA, according to the ESMA MMoU, is
that the law of a Member State allows such a refusal to cooperate.165
This is, however, restricted to requests that are not grounded on EU
law–i.e. when the requesting authority is not invoking a cooperation
duty set in an EU Directive and/or Regulation. The progressive
process of harmonization of EU securities laws has broadened the
catalogue of areas of financial regulation subject to EU law and,
consequently, to EU law-based cooperation duties, reducing, in turn,
the scope of Member State law-based waivers from cooperation.
Third, a refusal to cooperate may be founded upon an exception
to the duty to cooperate acknowledged by EU law. 166 The EU
legislator has not adopted a uniform approach to the treatment of
these exceptions. As a result, the regime regarding the waivers from
cooperation is a fragmented one and the scope of the CSAs’
cooperation duties varies according to the specific EU law or
instrument under which a request of cooperation is issued.
As will be shown in this Part, EU law waivers from supervisory
cooperation pursue the protection of legitimate rights and interests
that might be threatened by the actual provision of cooperation in
particular cases. However, at the same time, those very same waivers
give CSAs discretion as regards the interpretation of when and the
extent to which such threats exist. Consequently, there is the potential
risk of CSAs biasedly interpreting and invoking exceptions to the
duty to cooperate in order to withhold cooperation in an opportunistic
manner. This Part carries out a twofold analysis. First, it identifies the
various exceptions to the duty to cooperate embraced by EU
instruments and assesses the scope for their potential misuse. Second,
164. Id. art. 3.3.
165. Id. art. 3.4(c).
166. Id. art. 3.4(b).
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it examines the evolution of the legal treatment of those exceptions in
order to answer an important question: has the process of integration
of EU financial supervision led to a narrowing of the scope of the
exceptions to the duty to cooperate and, consequently, to more limited
degrees of discretion of the Member State CSAs in supervisory
cooperation decisions?
A. Waivers from Supervisory Cooperation Grounded on the Interest
of a Member State
A first category of waivers from the duty to cooperate refers to
instances in which the provision of cooperation would have a negative
effect on the protection of the interest –this concept broadly
understood– of the Member State of the requested CSA. For example,
some FSAP Directives–such as the Directive 2003/6/EC –Market
Abuse Directive (“MAD”)– 167 and the Directive 2004/39/EC –
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)– 168 allowed
CSAs to withhold cooperation when the latter “might adversely affect
the sovereignty, security or public policy of the State addressed”.169
The IOSCO MMoU also contemplates the possibility of a requested
CSA denying cooperation “on grounds of public interest or essential
national interest.” 170 These public interest-related exceptions gave
CSAs substantial freedom in the interpretation of their duty to
cooperate and, ultimately, in the decision of whether or not to
cooperate in a specific case, opening the door to potentially
protectionist behaviors; for instance, a requested CSA could use
public interest-related exceptions opportunistically, withholding the
exchange of information about firms operating in critical sectors–e.g.
energy, military–or with major relevance for the economy, even in
cases in which cooperation would pose no actual threat to the
sovereignty, security or public policy in the Member State of the
167. Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January
2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. L 96/16
[hereinafter MAD].
168. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and
93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. L 145/1 [hereinafter MiFID].
169. MAD, supra note 167, art. 16.4; MiFID, supra note 168, art. 59.
170. IOSCO MMoU, supra note 26, art. 6(e)(iv).
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requested CSA. EU laws have progressively limited the scope of
waivers related to the protection of the interest of a Member State
and, thus, the ability of CSAs to refuse cooperation on such grounds;
for example, the Regulation No. 596/2014–Market Abuse Regulation
(“MAR”)–, 171 which repeals the MAD, removed the references to
threats to the “sovereignty” and “public policy”, and focused, instead,
on cases in which the provision of cooperation “…could adversely
affect the security of the Member State addressed, in particular the
fight against terrorism and other serious crimes”. 172 MiFID II, which
partially recasts the MiFID, plainly eliminates any reference to
waivers linked to the protection of the interest of a Member State. 173
Nonetheless, CSAs would still be entitled to deny cooperation in
instances of threats to national security, as the latter is a Treaty-based
exclusive competence of the EU Member States. 174
B. Waivers from Supervisory Cooperation Grounded on the Principle
of Ne Bis In Idem
A second category of waivers relates to instances of res sub
judice and res judicata, and provides protection against double
jeopardy through the principle of ne bis in idem. These anti-double
jeopardy exceptions, which are common in EU laws and MoUs in the
financial field, allow CSAs to withhold cooperation in two scenarios.
First, when judicial proceedings have already been initiated with
regard to the same actions and the same persons before the authorities
of the Member State of the requested CSA. 175 Second, when final
judgment has already been delivered in the Member State of the
requested CSA with regard to the same persons and the same
actions. 176 These waivers do, however, pose certain problems of
interpretation that will be examined in the next paragraphs. As will be
shown, the evolution of the legal treatment of the anti-double
171. Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC,
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. L 173/1 [hereinafter MAR].
172. Id. art. 25.2(a).
173. MiFID II, supra note 156, art. 83.
174. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, art.
4.2.
175. See, e.g., MiFID II, supra note 156, art. 83(a); MAR, supra note 171, art. 25.2(c).
176. See, e.g., MiFID II, supra note 156, art. 83(b); MAR, supra note 171, art. 25.2(d).
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jeopardy exceptions –from their initial wording in the FESCO and
CESR MoUs to their current form– evidences that, overall, their
scope has been progressively broadened, and, consequently, the
ability of CSAs to refuse cooperation, increased.
The first question relates to the subject-matter jurisdictions
covered by the anti-double jeopardy waivers. Whereas the FESCO
and the CESR MoUs explicitly limited the lis pendens waivers to “ . .
. judicial proceedings for the imposition of criminal penalties . . . .
” 177 the reference to “criminal penalties” is absent in most post-FSAP
and post-crisis EU financial laws, which merely make reference to
“judicial proceedings,” without specifying any particular subjectmatter. This raises the question of whether a refusal to cooperate
might be grounded on the existence of judicial proceedings pertaining
to matters beyond the criminal realm. Whereas the application of the
principle of ne bis in idem has traditionally been limited to (national)
criminal justice, 178 over the years, the case law of the Court of Justice
of the European Union (“CJEU”) has construed it as a (transnational)
general principle of EU law, not necessarily limited to the criminal
jurisdiction but, instead, extendable to other types of judicial
processes with a punitive nature. 179 The omission of the reference to
“criminal penalties” may suggest that anti-double jeopardy waivers
embrace such EU law trend and extend to non-criminal jurisdictions –
e.g. civil jurisdiction cases. The practical effect of this approach is
that the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation would be broadened.
A second issue regards to whether anti-double jeopardy waivers
only apply to judicial proceedings/decisions or also include
administrative actions–for example, when a requested CSA has
already imposed a fine to a firm in relation to which the requesting
CSA solicits information. According to both the FESCO MoU and the
CESR MoU, administrative decisions were included in the antidouble jeopardy waivers. In this respect, the former read: “ . . . where
a non-appealable judicial or administrative sanction has already been

177. See, e.g., FESCO MoU, supra note 73, art. 3.3; CESR MoU, supra note 88, art. 3.3.
178. See John A.E. Vervaele, The Transnational Ne Bis In Idem Principle in the EU.
Mutual Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 100, 100
(2005).
179. Id. at 106; B. VAN BOCKEL, THE NE BIS IN IDEM PRINCIPLE IN EU LAW 223
(2010).
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imposed . . . ”, 180 and the latter referred to instances “ . . . where final
judgement has already been passed or administrative sanctions have
already been applied . . . . ” 181 In contrast, in force MoUs and EU
laws in the financial field seem to only explicitly include judicial
decisions. 182 Traditionally, EU law has adopted an ambiguous
approach to the treatment of administrative sanctions in the context of
ne bis in idem, often excluding administrative punitive decisions from
a strict application of such principle, with the result that the same
facts could result in sanctions at various jurisdictional levels. 183
Whereas some recent decisions of the CJEU encompass the notion
that administrative punitive decisions would bar double
prosecution, 184 certain post-crisis EU legislative developments seem
to take a very different view. For instance, the MAR acknowledges
the possibility of the same offence being subject to both criminal and
administrative sanctions. 185 Recent case law of the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECHR”) has taken a much clearer stand, arguing that
administrative enforcement and criminal prosecution for the same
actions are incompatible. Of particular relevance for financial market
practice, is the decision of the ECHR in Grande Stevens and Others v.
Italy. Grande Stevens and other defendants who committed market
manipulation were, first, fined administratively by the Italian
securities supervisor–the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la
Borsa (“Consob”)– 186 and, subsequently, subject to criminal
proceedings for the same facts. The ECHR argued that this constitutes
a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem embraced by Article 4 of
Protocol 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights –regarding
the right not to be tried or punished twice. In the framework of
180. FESCO MoU, supra note 73, art. 3.3.
181. CESR MoU, supra note 88, art. 3.3.
182. See, e.g., MAR, supra note 171, art. 25.2(d).
183. Vervaele, supra note 178, at 107.
184. See, e.g., Bonda, Case C-489/10, [2012] E.C.R. I-0000. Juliette Lelieur,
Transnationalising Ne Bis In Idem: How the Rule of Ne Bis In Idem Reveals the Principle of
Personal Legal Certainty, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 198, 207 (2013) (analyzing this question).
185. MAR, supra note 171, recital 72.
186. The ECHR did, nevertheless, consider the Consob’s administrative sanctions as
having a criminal nature. See Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, App. Nos. 18640/10,
18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10, 18698/10, Mar. 4, 2014 Judgment, at 16, 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2014). For a comment of this case see generally, Marco Ventoruzzo, Do Market Abuse Rules
Violate Human Rights? The Grande Stevens v. Italy Case (European Corporate Governance
Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 269/2014, 2014).
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cooperation between CSAs, it remains unclear what the scope of antidouble jeopardy waivers would be, in this respect. Even a full
encompassment, by EU law and case law, of the applicability of the
ne bis in idem principle to administrative sanctions, would not
necessarily extend to cooperation duties of CSAs–but, rather, to their
enforcement procedures. The silence of in force anti-double jeopardy
waivers on this matter, jointly with their emphasis on “judicial”
decisions, would indicate that the intention of the EU legislator was to
exclude administrative sanctions from the scope of such waivers. This
would, in turn, limit the ability of CSAs to decline cooperation. For
instance, the fact that the requested authority had already imposed a
fine with regard to the same persons and actions would not, per se,
enable it to withhold cooperation.
A third important question refers to the extent to which antidouble jeopardy waivers also embrace instances in which the request
of assistance is not aimed at bringing judicial proceedings or punitive
administrative enforcement against a person involved in the actions to
which the request of cooperation refers, for those very same actions–
and/or may not result in those proceedings being brought in the
jurisdiction of the requesting CSA. This would, for example, be the
case of a request of cooperation about facts relating to and/or persons
involved in a given securities laws violation, when such a request is
merely instrumental to another supervisory or enforcement procedure
relating to different actions and/or persons. The FESCO MoU offered
a rather straightforward answer to this question by limiting the
applicability of the anti-double jeopardy waivers to instances in which
“ . . . the provision of assistance might result in a judicial or
administrative sanction being imposed… in the jurisdiction of the
Requested Authority, in respect of the same actions and against the
same persons.” 187 A similar approach is found in the IOSCO MMoU,
which permits the requested CSA to refuse cooperation “ . . . unless
the Requesting Authority can demonstrate that the relief or sanctions
sought in any proceedings initiated by the Requesting Authority
would not be of the same nature or duplicative of any relief or
sanctions obtained in the jurisdiction of the Requested Authority.” 188
This is, however, an aspect in relation to which contemporary EU
187. FESCO MoU, supra note 73, art. 3.3.
188. IOSCO MMoU, supra note 26, art. 6(e)(ii).
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MoUs and legislation are silent, hence opening the door to rigid
interpretations that could back the withholding of cooperation, just
because a given request refers to the same actions and persons.
C. Waivers from Supervisory Cooperation Grounded on the Interest
of a Competent Supervisory Authority
There is a third category of cooperation waivers aimed at
protecting administrative investigation and enforcement activities in
the jurisdiction of the requested CSA. Such type of waiver was
introduced in the year 2014 by the MAR, which allows a requested
CSA to deny cooperation when: “complying with the request is likely
adversely to affect its own investigation, enforcement activities or,
where applicable, a criminal investigation.” 189 Although the reference
to “its own investigation and enforcement activities” can be
interpreted as referring to supervision regarding the same actions and
persons to which the request of cooperation refers, the subsequent
allusion to “a criminal investigation” seems to have a broader scope;
for example, it may be interpreted as including criminal investigations
by the requested CSA, relating to different persons and/or actions –or
even, more generally, to criminal investigations conducted in the
jurisdiction of the requested CSA by bodies different from the latter.
To a certain extent, the MAR expands the cooperation waivers from
the judicial to the, primarily administrative, non-judicial stage of an
investigation and/or enforcement action, but with a more restricted
character, i.e. only when the provision of cooperation has a likely
negative effect on investigation and/or enforcement activities in the
requested jurisdiction. From the point of view of the rights of the
CSAs of different Member States involved in a given investigation,
this waiver from cooperation poses some problems, because it
implicitly attributes greater weight and primacy to an investigation
and/or enforcement activity in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA–
which is entitled to decline cooperation–than to an investigation
and/or enforcement action in the jurisdiction of the requesting CSA,
which may equally suffer negative effects if the requested CSA
withholds cooperation on the grounds of the interest of its own
investigations.

189. MAR, supra note 171, art. 25.2(b).
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The analysis of the evolution of the content of the exceptions to
the duty to cooperate from their early configuration in the FESCO and
CESR MoUs to their current form –for example, in force EU
Directives and Regulations– shows that, whereas the scope of some
waivers has been narrowed, in certain instances it has been expanded
and, consequently, the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation
increased. Indeed, despite the greater degrees of supervisory
integration and centralization brought by the post-de Larosiére
framework, the regime concerning supervisory cooperation
exceptions still grants considerable discretion to the Member State
CSAs. One of the risks of such regime lies in its lack of clarity and
definition, opening the door to dissimilar interpretations across the
Member States. More importantly, it may result in potential
opportunistic behaviors by CSAs, which may justify the withholding
of cooperation on the basis of biased readings of the exceptions to the
duty to cooperate. Ultimately, disagreeing interpretations of the scope
of the duties–and exceptions–to cooperate bring about the risk of
increased supervisory dissent across the European Union. The next
Part examines and assesses post-crisis regulatory developments that
have instituted mechanisms of solution of disagreements among
CSAs, including instances of supervisory cooperation disputes.
VI. THE ESFS, THE EMERGENCE OF THE ESAS AS SETTLERS
OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION DISPUTES, AND THE
INCENTIVES OF CSAS TO COOPERATE
An important development brought about by the ESFS consisted
of the institutionalization of a rather formal dispute settlement
framework in which the ESAs are given extensive powers to resolve
disagreements between CSAs. These powers are instrumental to the
attainment of one of the key tasks of the ESAs, namely enhancing the
consistent application of legally binding Union acts. 190 Such
consistency may be hindered when, for example, CSAs have different
views about whether and how they are expected to cooperate with
each other or with the ESAs–as required by EU law.
The ESAs have been vested with various mechanisms, some
general and others ad hoc, that can be used to address instances of
lack of compliance with cooperation duties by CSAs. In contrast with
190. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 8.1(b).
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the Lamfalussy Committees, some of these mechanisms embrace the
use of binding powers by the ESAs. The allocation of dispute
settlement powers to the ESAs raises various questions that are
relevant to understand and assess the post-crisis transformation of
supervisory cooperation in the European Union. A first question
relates to the nature, scope and limitations of the ESAs’ instruments
of dispute settlement. The answer to this question is useful to respond
to a second question, namely, whether and why these new
mechanisms of dispute settlement may have an actual impact on the
incentives of CSAs to cooperate. Third, by performing a quasijudicial role in relation to CSAs, the ESAs are potentially subject to
conflicts of interest that may affect their ability to solve disputes in an
unbiased manner; it is, hence, important to understand the sources of
such conflicts as well as the extent to which these are properly tackled
by the EU regulatory and institutional frameworks. The next Sections
explore these issues through an analysis of the nature, scope and
potential effects of the ESAs’ dispute settlement mechanisms, in
respect of both the ESFS and the Banking Union.
A. The Mediation Mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations:
Scope and Limitations
The core mechanism of dispute settlement between CSAs is
provided by Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations, whereby the ESAs
may mediate between CSAs in cases “…where a competent authority
disagrees about the procedure or content of an action or inaction of a
competent authority…in cases specified in [legally binding Union
acts] . . . . ” 191 This provision embraces, inter alia, instances of
cooperation disputes between CSAs, such as those arising when a
requested CSA refuses to provide information to a requesting CSA.
The reference to both ‘content’ and ‘procedure’ amplifies the reach of
the ESAs’ mediation powers to, not only cases in which a request of
cooperation is rejected, but also instances in which a requesting CSA
is not satisfied with the quality of the cooperation provided –e.g. if the
requesting CSA deems the information provided by the requested
CSA to be incomplete or inadequate. The mediation mechanism of
Article 19 consists of a one-to-three step process, where progression

191. Id. art. 19.1.

632

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:589

to each consecutive step depends on whether a solution is reached or
not in the previous.
In step one (conciliation), an ESA mediates between the CSAs in
disagreement, assisting them in the reaching of a solution. The
conciliation step may be initiated at the request of CSA(s) or on an
ESA’s own initiative–in the latter case, whenever the disagreement
can be determined on the basis of objective criteria.192 The role of an
ESA at this stage is that of a mere facilitator of cooperation between
the CSAs in dispute. 193 If the CSAs do not reach a solution within a
time limit specified by the relevant ESA, 194 then the latter may decide
to proceed to step two.
In step two (binding mediation), an ESA adopts a binding
decision addressed to the CSAs in dispute that settles the
disagreement, by requiring them to take specific action or refrain
from it. 195 An example would be a decision whereby a requested CSA
must provide certain information to a requesting CSA. Step twodecisions are binding and, therefore, CSAs are expected to comply
with them. However, if they do not do so, then an ESA may proceed
to step three.
In step three (direct binding decision), an ESA adopts an
individual decision addressed to a financial market participant. Such
decision requires it to take specific action or refrain from it. 196 This
mechanism is aimed at guaranteeing that, when a CSA does not
comply with a binding mediation decision, the market participants
concerned follow courses of action that, somehow, overcome the
failure of a CSA to observe an ESA’s settlement.
The mediation process is led by Mediation Panels within each
ESA. 197 These panels are appointed by the respective Boards of
Supervisors and composed of the Chair of an ESA plus two members
–six in the EBA–of its Board of Supervisors who neither represent the
CSAs in disagreement nor have direct links with the latter or any

192. Id.
193. A similar mechanism of non-binding mediation between CSAs is also envisaged by
art. 31 of the ESAs Regulations.
194. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 19.2.
195. Id. art. 19.3.
196. Id. art. 19.4.
197. Id. art. 41.2.
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interest in the dispute. 198 The decisions of a Mediation Panel with a
proposed binding settlement are forwarded to the relevant Board of
Supervisors for final adoption, 199 which generally requires simple
majority of its members. 200
The powers of the ESAs under Article 19 are much more
extensive than those held by the Lamfalussy Committees. In the first
place, the powers of the Lamfalussy Committees were not binding,201
unlike those of the ESAs, which may settle a disagreement between
CSAs through a binding decision. Second, the ESAs can, at their own
discretion –where disagreements are objectively determinable–, step
into a dispute and initiate a mediation process, whereas the
Lamfalussy Committees were able to play a mediation role, only after
a request from a CSA. 202 Despite the width of the powers granted to
the ESAs under Article 19, there are some important limitations and
interpretative problems regarding their application to instances of
supervisory dissent.
First, the mechanism of Article 19 can only be applied when an
EU legally binding act explicitly backs such use –and only for the
purposes specified in it. 203 EU financial sector Directives and
Regulations take different stances in this respect, some being more
restrictive than others. For example, Article 82 of MiFID II embraces
a far-reaching application of Article 19, enabling its use to address
disagreements between CSAs “where a request relating to one of the
following has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a
reasonable time: (a) to carry out a supervisory activity, an on-the-spot
verification, or an investigation, as provided for in Article 80; or (b)
to exchange information as provided for in Article 81.” In contrast,
Article 23.4 of the Regulation No. 236/2012 (“Short Selling
Regulation”), 204 provides for a more narrow application of Article 19,
198. Id. art. 41.2.
199. Id. art. 41.3.
200. Id. art. 44.1.
201. See, e.g., CESR, Protocol on Mediation Mechanism of the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR/06-286b), art. 5.
202. See, e.g., id. art. 3.
203. See ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 19.1; see also Wymeersch, supra note
118, at 266.
204. Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, 2012 O.J. L 86/1
[hereinafter Short Selling Regulation].

634

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:589

limiting its use to instances where “a competent authority disagrees
with the action taken by another competent authority on a financial
instrument traded on different venues regulated by different
competent authorities . . . . ”
Second, step two and step three of the mediation mechanism
require the existence of a breach of EU law, which the mediation
process aims to put to an end to. For example, as indicated above,
when a requested CSA withholds information that a requesting
authority has the right to access and which the requested CSA ought
to provide–according to the general duty of cooperation between
CSAs and/or concrete cooperation duties set in EU financial laws–,
there would be a breach of EU law and the ESA concerned would,
hence, be entitled to use a step two-binding decision to settle the
disagreement–if the conciliatory phase failed. However, cooperation
disputes founded on breaches of domestic laws establishing specific
cooperation duties would be excluded from this mediation
mechanism, as long as they do not imply a breach of EU law.
Likewise, discretionary actions by Member State CSAs, based on
explicit or implicit EU legislative delegations, are shielded from and
cannot be superseded by ESAs' binding mediation decisions, as long
as the exercise of such discretion is in compliance with EU law. 205
In addition, the general applicability of step three-decisions to
supervisory cooperation disputes is questionable. In this respect,
section 3 of Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations stipulates that:
. . . where a competent authority does not comply with the
decision of the Authority, and thereby fails to ensure that a
financial market participant complies with requirements directly
applicable to it by virtue of the acts referred to in Article 1(2), the
Authority may adopt an individual decision addressed to a
financial market participant requiring the necessary action to
comply with its obligations under Union law . . . .

Therefore, Article 19.3 seems to limit the applicability of direct
binding decisions to instances in which lack of compliance of a CSA
with an ESA’s binding mediation decision also results in and/or
implies lack of compliance of a market participant with EU law.206
205. See, e.g., EBA Regulation, supra note 115, recital 32.
206. Wymeersch highlights the limited applicability of direct binding decisions, to only
directly applicable regulations. See Wymeersch, supra note 118, at 270.
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This is, however, not necessarily the case in cooperation disputes. For
instance, when a CSA does not abide by a binding decision of an
ESA, it may be breaching EU law–for example, general cooperation
duties– without this necessarily resulting in a consequential breach of
EU law by a market participant. These limitations to the powers of the
ESAs in the use of step two and step three-decisions are, indeed,
consistent with the Meroni doctrine, according to which EU
institutions cannot delegate discretionary powers that involve wide
margins of discretion. 207
Third, the safeguard clause of Article 38 of the ESAs
Regulations, whereby step two-mediation decisions must not impinge
on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States, might also pose
some limitations to the use of binding mediation by an ESA, notably
in the context of resolution disputes. 208 If a Member State considers
that there is such an impingement, it may trigger a procedure that
involves the binding decision of the ESA being suspended,
reconsidered by the latter, and whenever maintained, subject to
scrutiny by the Council, which decides whether to uphold it or not. 209
Nevertheless, owing to the creation of the Single Resolution
Mechanism and the transfer of resolution authority to the Single
Resolution Board, the room for decisions of an ESA regarding
resolution disputes with an impact on the fiscal responsibilities of the
Member States is more reduced and so is the scope for invoking a
breach of Article 38.
In addition to the procedure for the challenge of decisions of
Article 38 of the ESAs Regulations, which is restricted to instances
when an ESA’s binding decision invades the fiscal responsibilities of
a Member State, CSAs are entitled to challenge mediation decisions

207. Meroni v. High Authority, Case 9/56, [1957-58] E.C.R. 133. On the different views
about the scope of discretion of the ESAs in the use of Art. 19, see NIAMH MOLONEY, EU
SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION 980 (3d ed. 2014).
208 . IMF, EUROPEAN UNION: PUBLICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION - TECHNICAL NOTE ON PROGRESS WITH BANK RESTRUCTURING
AND RESOLUTION IN EUROPE, COUNTRY REPORT 13/67, 15 (2013); House of Lords EU
Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee (UK), Correspondence with Ministers, Letter
from the Rt. Hon. Greg Clark MP to the Chairman (June 7, 2013),
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-a/CWM/cwm201314/CwMsubA9May13-30Nov13-.pdf [https://perma.cc/663J-NQ65] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
209. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 38.
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adopted by the ESAs before the ESAs’ Board of Appeal, 210 and,
eventually, before the CJEU; 211 this remedy could for instance be
used when a CSA deems an ESA’s decision arbitrary or adopted
without following applicable statutory procedural requirements.
A potential additional limitation of the mediation mechanism of
Article 19 relates to the nature of the organs in charge of adopting
binding decisions. The voting power within both the Mediation Panels
and the Boards of Supervisors –which are in charge of proposing and
adopting binding decisions, respectively– is primarily concentrated in
representatives of CSAs; 212 it is unclear the extent to which these may
be able to vote impartially, merely on the facts of the dispute at stake
in a given case. The political economy of voting in binding mediation
processes may be influenced by factors such as the relationships and
mutual interests between the voting members of a Board of
Supervisors and the CSAs in dispute; this may in turn create
distortions, especially when voting procedures are not secret. 213 For
example, a member of a Board of Supervisors may be reluctant to cast
a vote against the interest of a certain CSA in a particular cooperation
dispute for fear of negative repercussions in the cooperation
relationships with that CSA in the future. In September 2017 the
Commission presented a legislative proposal that, if adopted by the
EU legislature, would shift decision-making power in the mediation
mechanism from the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors to new bodies of
the ESAs, namely the Executive Boards, made of independent full-

210. Id. art. 60.1. This is a joint body of the ESAs composed of six members and six
alternates with high repute and proven experience in financial services and who are not
employed by national or Union institutions involved in the activities of the ESAs –see id. art.
58.2.
211. Id. art. 61.1.
212 . In the Mediation Panels, the voting members are the Chairpersons and the
representatives from CSAs –see id. art. 41.2. In the Boards of Supervisors, the voting members
are the representatives of CSAs –see id. art. 44.1.
213. The standard voting procedure in the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs seems to
be the show of hands vote, but the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Supervisors also
acknowledge the possibility of secret voting for certain matters –see, e.g., EBA, Decision
adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Banking Authority Board of Supervisors
(EBA/DC/2011/001, Rev 4), art. 7.5 –, and/or upon request of some of its members –see, e.g.,
EIOPA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority Board of Supervisors (EIOPA-BoS-11/002, Rev3), art. 4.7.
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time members –so as to address, inter alia, potential conflicts of
interest as those above-referred. 214
1. Does the Mediation Mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs
Regulations Have an Impact on the Incentives of CSAs to Cooperate?
A relevant question relating to Article 19’s mediation
mechanism is whether and how it may impact supervisory
cooperation between CSAs and deter them from undue lack of
cooperation. In order to answer this question it is first important to
understand the costs resulting from the application of the mediation
mechanism–especially when it escalates to step two. Binding
mediation may result in costs for both the requesting and requested
CSAs.
On the one side, a binding mediation of an ESA overturning a
non-cooperation decision of a requested CSA may result in certain
costs for the latter. In the first place, the binding decision will have
214. See Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority); Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority);
Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Securities and Markets Authority); Regulation (EU) No. 345/2013 on European venture capital
funds; Regulation (EU) No. 346/2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds; Regulation
(EU) No. 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments; Regulation (EU) 2015/760 on
European long-term investment funds; Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 on indices used as
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of
investment funds; and Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 on the prospectus to be published when
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, COM (2017)
536 final, at 20, 22, 23 and 68 [hereinafter Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs];
see also Commission, Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority),
Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Securities and Markets Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 345/2013 on European venture capital
funds, Regulation (EU) No. 346/2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds, Regulation
(EU) No. 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments, Regulation (EU) 2015/760 on
European long-term investment funds, Regulation (EU) 2016/2011 on indices used as
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of
investment funds, Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 on the prospectus to be published when
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, SWD(2017)
308 final, at 46-7 [hereinafter Impact Assessment on the Commission Proposal on the Review
of the ESAs].
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the immediate result of compelling the CSA concerned to perform an
action–e.g the forwarding of information to the requesting CSA– that
it likely deems prejudicial to its own interests and/or the interests of
actors that it is bound to protect, such as investors or consumers of
financial services in its jurisdiction. Second, a binding mediation may
limit the discretion of a CSA in deciding whether to cooperate or not
in the future, because its decisions in that regard will be largely bound
by what an ESA has ruled in prior binding mediation procedures. In
this respect, the binding mediation constitutes a quasi-regulatory tool
through which the ESAs can shape the behavior of CSAs, by
signaling the preferences of the former about the extent and scope of
cooperation that the latter are expected to provide in similar instances
as those being subject to a mediation process. It follows that a CSA
whose decision not to cooperate in a particular case has been
overturned by an ESA, may, in the future, adjust its supervisory
behavior to the expectations of such ESA–even when those
supervisory courses of action are contrary to the policy views and
preferences of the CSA concerned–, in order to avoid the threat of
binding mediation processes being initiated. Third, owing to the fact
that binding mediation decisions must be approved by the Boards of
Supervisors of the ESAs, 215 and that, consequently, the nature and
scope of the disagreements are made known to fellow CSAs within an
ESA, 216 the reputation of the CSAs whose non-cooperative actions
are upturned, vis-à-vis other CSAs, may be hindered–especially
whenever an ESA justifies its binding decision on an alleged lack of
consistency and/or reasonableness of the requested CSA’s behavior.
Because binding mediation may bring about important costs for a
requested CSA, the latter will tailor its behavior to the assessment of
the likeliness of an ESA’s mediation process being initiated, either at
the demand of the requesting CSA or on an ESA’s own initiative.
Likewise, the threat of binding mediation may contribute to deter a
215. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 19.3, 44.1.
216. The proposal for a binding mediation decision that a Mediation Panel submits to a
Board of Supervisors for approval in the binding mediation stage must include, among others:
the identity of the CSAs involved in the dispute; the opinion of the Mediation Panel on how to
settle the disagreement, as well as the reasons on which it is based; and, if appropriate, the
deadline by which the CSAs addressed by the decision should take action or refrain from it.
The proposed decision must also be accompanied by materials indicating the views of the
CSAs concerned about the proposed settlement –see, e.g., ESMA, Decision of the Board of
Supervisors. Rules of procedure of the Mediation Panel (ESMA/2012/BS/86), arts. 7.6-7.
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requested CSA from arbitrary or inconsistent non-cooperation
decisions that could potentially trigger the mediation process–or, if
the latter is initiated, to revise its decision in the conciliatory phase.
On the other side, a decision adopted by an ESA in the context
of a binding mediation may also create costs for the requesting CSA.
By submitting a dispute to an ESA for mediation, the requesting
authority is, in fact, shifting decisional power away from the
requested CSA to the relevant ESA. Hence, the mere request of an
ESA’s intervention through mediation may harm the trust of the
requested authority in the requesting authority, impairing the
relationships between them. 217 This may, in turn, affect the quality of
future cooperation; for instance, a requested CSA may be more
reluctant to voluntarily disclose unsolicited information that could,
nonetheless, be useful for the requesting CSA. A requesting CSA will
apply for an ESA’s mediation if the potential costs resulting from
such a request are lower than the potential benefits of the provision of
cooperation stemming from an ESA’s mediation. This will, most
likely, be limited to very relevant supervisory procedures–e.g. with a
major impact on the markets and actors in the jurisdiction of the
requesting CSA– and where the probability of an ESA’s decision
upholding the requesting CSA’s demands vis-à-vis the requested CSA
are high–e.g. if and when the grounds for lack of cooperation by the
requested CSA are weak.
The data regarding the use of mediation by the ESAs would
support the hypothesis of Article 19’s deterrent effect. For instance,
since the ESAs became operative, only the EBA applied the
mediation process of Article 19; this happened in two occasions, both
in the year 2014, and, in both cases, the disagreement was settled in
step one of the process, that is, in the conciliation phase. 218 In its
Annual Report of the year 2015, the EBA did, indeed, highlight its
pre-eminently informal role in the settlement of disagreements
between CSAs: “Although there have been several cases of
disagreements between CAs, during 2015 the EBA has not been
approached with a request to provide its assistance in one of these
formal procedures on mediation. Nonetheless, the EBA played an
217. See, e.g., Eilis Ferran, The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority,
17 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 285, 307 (2016).
218. EBA, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, 56 (2015).
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important role in providing its assistance to settle disagreements
between CAs in an informal way”. 219 The Commission’s review of
the ESFS acknowledged the potentially dissuasive effect of the
binding mediation mechanism, recognizing, at the same time, the
“lack of clarity” of the ESAs Regulations with respect to the scope of
binding mediation, suggesting that this may be addressed in future
reforms of the ESAs Regulations. 220
2. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution
Mechanism and the Role of the EBA as a Mediator Between the
Banking Union EU Level Supervisory Structures and Member State
CSAs
The creation of the SSM and the SRM and the allocation of
direct supervisory responsibilities within these structures to the ECB
and the SRB, respectively, have led to a reconfiguration of the
supervisory relationships within the EU financial supervision
architecture. Under the SSM and the SRM, both the ECB and the
SRB are bound by cooperation duties vis-à-vis CSAs and the EBA as
well as between each other. Supervisory cooperation is given a central
role within the SSM: “It is essential for the smooth functioning of the
SSM that there is full cooperation between the ECB and NCAs and
that they exchange all the information that may have an impact on
their respective tasks . . . ” 221 Likewise, the SRM Regulation
embraces close supervisory cooperation of the SRB with the EBA–
and, where appropriate, also with the ESRB, the ESMA, the EIOPA
and other supervisory authorities in the ESFS–, the ECB and other

219. EBA, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, 83 (2016). In the early stages of development of the
EBA, its Chairperson –Andrea Enria– described the EBA’s binding mediation “more as a
nuclear deterrent than an actual power.” –House of Lords (UK), Unrevised transcript of
evidence taken before the Select Committee on the European Union; Economic and Financial
Affairs and International Trade (Sub-Committee A). Inquiry on EU Financial Supervisory
Framework (May 3, 2011), at 3.
220. Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final, at 7.
221. Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014
establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between
the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated
authorities (ECB/2014/17), recital 11, 2014 O.J. L 141/1 [hereinafter SSM Framework
Regulation].
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supervisory authorities within the SSM, as well as with resolution
authorities. 222
Under the EBA Regulation, both the ECB and the SRB are
deemed CSAs and, hence, subject to the EBA’s supervisory remit.223
The regulatory framework acknowledges the applicability of the
EBA’s mediation mechanism to supervisory cooperation disputes
involving the ECB and the SRB. As regards the ECB, the EBA’s
Rules of Procedure for the Settlement of Disagreements between
Competent Authorities, stipulate that: “In view of the supervisory
tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the
EBA should be able to carry out its tasks also in relation to the ECB
in the same manner as in relation to the other competent
authorities.” 224 Also, the SRM Regulation recognizes that, for the
purposes of the Directive 2014/59/EU –Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (“BRRD”)–, the SRB is bound by the EBA’s
mediation decisions. 225
The scope of applicability of the mediation mechanism is more
limited in respect of the SRB than the ECB. This is because,
according to the EBA Regulation, the SRB will be considered a CSA
–and, hence, subject to the EBA’s mediation processes and decisions–
only when and if it is not exercising discretionary powers or making
policy choices. 226 Owing to the fact that supervision and resolution
tasks generally embrace the exercise of margins of discretion, the
potential role of the EBA as a settler of disagreements involving the
SRB will be very narrow. 227
The efficient functioning of the principal-agent institutional
design, on which both the SSM and the SRM are based, 228 requires a
smooth interaction between EU level CSAs–namely, the ECB and the
222. SRM Regulation, supra note 135, recital 89.
223. EBA Regulation, supra note 115, arts. 4.2(i), (iv).
224. EBA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure for the settlement of disagreements
between competent authorities (EBA/DC/2014/091, Rev 1), recital 4.
225. SRM Regulation, supra note 135, art. 5.2.
226. EBA Regulation, supra note 115, art. 4.2(iv).
227 . On the limitations to the EBA’s binding mediation powers resulting from the
‘discretionary powers’ exception, see Niamh Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its
risks and resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1609, 1669 (2014).
228. For an application of the principal-agent model to the analysis of the SSM, see
Jakub Gren, David Howarth, & Lucia Quaglia, Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe:
The Construction of a Credible Watchdog, 53 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 181 (2015).
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SRB– on the one side, and the Member State CSAs on the other. For
instance, in the SSM, the ECB largely relies on CSAs for the
enforcement of prudential regulation 229 and, in the SRM, the SRB
delegates the execution of resolution schemes to national resolution
authorities. 230 In addition, the SSM and the SRM are mutually
dependent and require a close cooperation between the ECB and the
SRB in tasks such as the development of recovery and resolution
plans. 231 For reasons similar to those explained above with regard to
the ESFS, the activation of the mediation mechanism could lead to
costs for both requesting and requested CSAs within the SSM and the
SRM. Therefore, it would most likely be relied upon only as a last
resort mechanism in exceptional circumstances.
B. Disagreements Between the ESAs and CSAs: the ESAs as
Interested Parties and Judges
As has been explained in the preceding Parts, the ESFS
encompasses a series of supervisory cooperation duties between the
ESAs and CSAs, raising the possibility of disagreements about the
rationale, grounds, extent and scope of those duties in concrete
supervisory scenarios. Although the ESAs Regulations do not offer ad
hoc mechanisms of settlement of cooperation disputes between the
ESAs and CSAs, they, nevertheless, embrace instruments that can be
used for such purpose. An example is Article 17 of the ESAs
Regulations, which institutes a three-level procedure to address
breaches of EU law by CSAs. In the first stage, an ESA is empowered
to investigate alleged breaches of EU law by a CSA and to issue
recommendations directed to the latter with indications on the steps to
take so as to remedy such breaches. 232 If the CSA concerned fails to
comply with the recommendation, then there is a second stage where
the Commission may issue a formal opinion, requiring the CSA to
229. T.H. Tröger, A political economy perspective on common supervision in the
Eurozone: Observations on some strengths and weaknesses of the SSM, in FINANCIAL
REGULATION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 177 (Faia et al. eds., 2015).
230. E. Wymeersch, Banking Union; Aspects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and
the Single Resolution Mechanism compared, 5 (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 290/2015,
2015).
231. E. Angelopoulou, Resolution Planning from a Supervisors Perspective, FinSAC
Workshop (Vienna, Apr. 24, 2015), at 12-13.
232. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 17.1-3.
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take action to comply with EU law. 233 Lastly, if the CSA fails to
observe the Commission’s opinion, then the process may move to a
third stage where an ESA is vested with the power to issue an
individual binding decision directly addressed to a financial
institution, in order to remedy the lack of compliance with EU law. 234
Whereas the mechanism envisaged by Article 17 of the ESAs
Regulations is primarily aimed at tackling instances in which a CSA
fails to ensure that supervised entities comply with EU financial
sector laws, 235 its scope of applicability is broad, as it may be used by
an ESA “Where a competent authority has not applied the acts
referred to in Article 1(2), or has applied them in a way which appears
to be a breach of Union law . . . . ” 236 On the one side, this would
include cases where a CSA fails to comply with cooperation duties
vis-à-vis other CSAs but where there is no apparent express
disagreement between the CSAs concerned and the mechanism of
Article 19 is not deployed. 237 On the other side, it could also comprise
instances in which a CSA breaches cooperation duties set in EU acts
vis-à-vis the ESAs. As regards the latter, the cooperation mandates
instituted by EU financial sector laws are rather all-encompassing; for
example, according to the Short Selling Regulation: “The competent
authorities shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this
Regulation…The competent authorities shall provide, without delay,
ESMA with all the information necessary to carry out its duties”.238
As a result, the ESAs may enjoy substantial discretion in the actual
determination of the extent and scope of the supervisory cooperation
duties of CSAs towards them.
The application of Article 17 of the ESAs Regulations to
supervisory cooperation disputes between an ESA and a CSA would
raise the question of the ability of the former to exercise independent
judgment because, in those instances, an ESA would be acting, both
as one of the parties to the dispute and as a judge. This would pose
233. Id. art. 17.4.
234. Id. art. 17.6.
235. Id. art. 17.1.
236. Id.
237. The Chairperson of an ESA may determine, on a case-by-case basis, that mediation
is more suitable for dealing with an alleged breach of EU law –see, e.g., EBA, Decision
adopting Rules of Procedure for Investigation of Breach of Union Law (EBA/DC/2014/100),
Annex 2.
238. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 204, art. 36.
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some legitimacy concerns, especially in light of the extensive powers
conferred on the ESAs throughout the various stages of the procedure
of Article 17. In this respect, an ESA has full control of the first stage
of the procedure, as it has the power to initiate an investigation on its
own initiative and also to issue a recommendation. 239 In addition, in
the second stage, the Commission’s opinion “Shall take into account
the Authority’s recommendation”. 240 Furthermore, in the third stage,
an ESA is vested with binding powers to put an end to a breach of EU
law through an individual decision. 241
Despite the prima facie extensive reach of the powers of the
ESAs under Article 17, these are also subject to important limitations.
In the first place, the scope of an ESA’s direct binding decision for
breaches of EU law is restricted to instances in which lack of
compliance of a CSA with the Commission’s formal opinion also
results in and/or implies lack of compliance of a market participant
with EU law 242 –which, as has been explained in relation to the
mediation procedure in Section VI.A may not always be the case in
instances of supervisory disagreement. Additionally, the power of an
ESA to issue a direct binding decision under Article 17 is subject to
strict conditionality–e.g. actual or potential distortion to competition
or the functioning or integrity of the financial system, and direct
applicability of the relevant EU law to the financial institution to
which the binding decision is addressed. 243 These conditions largely
restrict the use of Article 17 in supervisory cooperation disputes
between an ESA and a CSA. Furthermore, a decision of an ESA
based on Article 17 may be challenged by a CSA before the Board of
Appeal of the ESAs 244 and, ultimately, before the CJEU; 245
consequently, this reduces the potential of an ESA’s prejudiced use of
Article 17. The Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs also
embraces a shift of decision-making power in relation to Article 17,
from the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors to the ESAs’ Executive

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 17.2-3.
Id. art. 17.4.
Id. art. 17.6.
Id.
Id.
ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 60.
Id. art. 61.
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Boards, with a view to, among others, reducing the scope of national
interferences in decisions pertaining to breaches of EU law. 246
VII. THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE DUTY TO COOPERATE AND
THE ABILITY TO COOPERATE: MULTI-LEVEL SUPERVISORY
POWERS, LEGAL MANDATES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
As has been explained throughout the previous Parts, the
constitutional, legal and regulatory frameworks at both the European
Union and Member State levels institute, in different degrees,
cooperation duties between CSAs. Compliance with those
cooperation duties requires an adequate empowerment of the
supervisory authorities, which, for instance, enables them to fulfill a
given request of cooperation from a counterpart. When and if a CSA
does not have adequate powers to cooperate, the effective provision
of cooperation may be hindered. The fragmented nature of the
European supervisory framework, where supervisory powers are
widespread among several CSAs operating at different levels, may
trigger some tensions between cooperation duties, on the one side,
and the ability of CSAs to provide cooperation, on the other. Such
tensions owe to two primary reasons.
First, CSAs across the European Union diverge substantially in
their structures and powers. Over the years, each Member State has
developed its own financial supervisory architecture based on local
preferences, experiences, and needs. 247 This has resulted in a
somewhat byzantine scheme that combines, not only various financial
supervisory models–such as the three-pillar, the single supervisor248
or the twin-peaks–, but also distinctive and, often, dissimilar domestic
approaches to the CSAs’ supervisory powers. Moreover, Member
States frequently shift from one model to another, notably, as a result
of crises or scandals in the financial realm and to consequential
concerns about the effectiveness of institutional financial supervisory
246. See Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs, supra note 214, at 20, 22,
23, 68. See also Impact Assessment on the Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs,
supra note 214, at 46-7.
247. See, e.g., ECB, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES IN THE EU
MEMBER STATES (2007-10) 1 (2010).
248. In this model, also known as the integrated approach, a single CSA is entrusted with
both the prudential and conduct of business supervision of all financial sectors and entities in a
given jurisdiction. Group of Thirty, supra note 22, at 13-14.
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frameworks. 249 This has led to a complex and heterogeneous
supervisory picture. Although the global financial crisis has brought
about limited institutional convergence towards the twin-peaks
model, 250 there still are major divergences in the structures and
powers of CSAs across Member States. 251 Second, financial
supervision involves carrying out actions subject to substantive and
procedural requirements of various areas of the law, such as general
administrative law and data protection rules, which also vary
significantly across the Member States.
The diversity of supervisory architectures and powers, as well as
the differences in the general legal frameworks relevant to the
provision of supervisory cooperation may create some practical
problems; notably, when a CSA from a Member State requests the
performance of a supervisory action to a CSA from another Member
State, the latter may not be able to perform it owing to lack of powers,
or because such provision of cooperation would result in a breach of
its domestic laws. The Lamfalussy reports acknowledged the diversity
of supervisory competences of CSAs across the European Union and
the potential negative impact that such differences might have on
supervisory cooperation; 252 they also highlighted the need for
convergence of supervisory powers available to CSAs. 253 These calls
for greater convergence were reflected in various FSAP directives,
such as the MiFID and the MAD, which introduced regimes
concerning the minimum supervisory powers of CSAs. For example,
Article 12 of the MAD and Article 50.2 of the MiFID both developed
rather comprehensive ad minimis catalogues of powers that CSAs
must have at their disposal for the exercise of supervisory functions,
including, among others, the authority to access documents and
data,254 to require or demand information from any person, 255 and to
249. See generally, Donato Masciandaro et al., Regulating the Regulators: The Changing
Face of Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Crisis, 6 EUR. COMPANY L.
187 (2009) (explaining why Member States change their financial regulatory schemes).
250. PETER VAN CLEYNENBREUGEL, MARKET SUPERVISION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 210 (2015).
251. See ECB, supra note 247.
252. See Initial Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 34-35; Lamfalussy Report, supra
note 80, at 21; see also Commission, Communication from the Commission: Review of the
Lamfalussy Process – Strengthening Supervisory Convergence, COM (2007) 727 final, at 10.
253. See Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 38.
254. MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2(a); MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.2(a).
255. MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2(b); MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.2(b).
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carry out on-site inspections. 256 The specific scope of these minimum
supervisory powers was nonetheless limited by Member States’
domestic laws. 257 If a Member State’s domestic laws did not empower
a CSA to directly exercise a given supervisory power included in the
catalogue of minimum supervisory powers set by the relevant EU
financial laws, 258 the latter embraced the possibility of and required
the co-exercise of such powers with other regulatory authorities, their
delegation to regulatory authorities, or their exercise by application to
judicial authorities. 259 In other words, according to the regulatory
model encompassed by EU financial law, for each supervisory power
listed among the minimum powers there ought to be an authority able
to either exercise or co-exercise it in every Member State. Whereas
this regulatory framework brought about increasing consistency to the
EU financial supervisory system, it also had some flaws, notably, it
encouraged a minimum harmonization of powers available at the
Member State level for supervisory tasks rather than a convergence of
CSAs’ supervisory powers across Member States. Under this system,
tasks instrumental to financial supervision may be decentralized
across various authorities, not necessarily limited to CSAs. These
supervisory chains pose a risk of increasing the complexity of the
supervisory architecture. 260 Likewise, they may make supervisory
cooperation more complex because, under them, the accomplishment
of a single supervisory action–such as the gathering of information
from a market participant–may require coordinated action by or
authorizations from different entities in one Member State. The risk
of inefficient supervisory cooperation may be exacerbated when some
authorities–such as the judiciary–in charge of some tasks within a
supervisory chain lack independence or efficiency.

256. MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2(c); MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.2(c).
257. See, e.g., MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2 (“the powers referred to in paragraph 1 of
this Article shall be exercised in conformity with national law and shall include at least the
right to . . .”).
258. This could, for instance, be the case in which a CSA of a given Member State is not
empowered to intervene telephone conversations or enter the premises of a firm only after
receiving judicial authorization. On the differences between the powers of CSAs of the
Member States in relation to market abuse supervision, see CESR, Review Panel Report:
MAD Options and Discretions (CESR/09-1120), at 88-93.
259. See, e.g., MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.1; MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.1.
260. See, e.g., Nicolas Véron, Is Europe Ready for a Major Banking Crisis?, 4 (Bruegel
Policy Brief No. 2007/03, 2007).
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The de Larosiére Report voiced concerns about the persistence
of important differences in the powers of CSAs and recommended the
adoption of measures aimed at enhancing the consistency of CSAs’
supervisory remits across the European Union. 261 In its
Communication on Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in the Financial
Services Sector, 262 the Commission acknowledged that the differences
among legal systems of the Member States was one of the reasons
behind the divergences in the sanctioning powers of CSAs and
undertook to make proposals targeted at furthering greater
convergence in this area. 263 Post-crisis EU legislation has attempted
to foster convergence primarily by broadening and redefining the
catalogue of powers of CSAs. For example, the MAR has added the
power “to enter the premises of natural and legal persons in order to
seize documents and data” 264 to the list of minimum powers of CSAs,
as this was a power lacked by some CSAs. 265 Despite these
improvements in the consistency of the scope of the CSAs’
supervisory powers, the post-crisis EU financial laws are largely
inspired by the regime of minimum harmonization of supervisory
powers subject to national implementation, as developed by the FSAP
directives. 266 Consequently, they reflect one of the weaknesses of the
pre-crisis regime, namely, the risk of supervisory powers being
exercised through chains of actors. This may increase the complexity
of –while also hindering the efficiency of–supervisory cooperation.
261. De Larosiére Report, supra note 38, at 23, 39-42.
262. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector, COM (2010) 716 final.
263. Id. at 6.
264. MAR, supra note 171, art. 23.2(e).
265. See Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Insider Dealing Market Manipulation (Market Abuse) and the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Criminal Sanctions for Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation, SEC (2011) 1217 final, at 25.
266. See, e.g., MAR, supra note 171, art. 23.2 (“In order to fulfil their duties under this
Regulation, competent authorities shall have, in accordance with national law, at least the
following supervisory and investigatory powers”) (emphasis added); see also MiFID II, supra
note 156, art. 72.1; MAR, supra note 171, art. 23.1; Directive 2013/36/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 64.2, 2013 O.J. L
176/338 [hereinafter CRD IV].
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An aspect relating to the CSAs’ ability to cooperate with each
other, to which the post-de Larosiére overhaul has given particular
attention, is the CSAs’ mandates. The creation of the ESFS and the
Banking Union, and the allocation of important tasks to CSAs within
them, has led to the configuration of transnational mandates that
obligate CSAs to accomplish goals beyond their own jurisdictions.
For instance, in their role as members of the governing bodies of the
ESAs, the SSM and the SRM, representatives of CSAs must act in the
interest of the European Union as a whole. 267 Some post-crisis EU
laws also embrace general transnational mandates that CSAs must
abide within their day-to-day supervision at the national level. For
example, Article 7 of the Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD
IV”) stipulates that: “the competent authorities in each Member State
shall, in the exercise of their general duties, duly consider the
potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial
system in the other Member States concerned and, in particular, in
emergency situations, based on the information available at the
relevant time.”
Despite the post-crisis broadening of the Member State CSAs’
mandates, the latter remain, to a primary extent, national and relate to
the accomplishment of objectives pertaining to financial systems,
markets, institutions and firms in the CSAs’ own jurisdictions. The
laws instituting national CSAs often acknowledge, in an explicit
manner, the national character of the CSAs’ mandates. For example,
in the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA
2000”) defines the FCA’s integrity objective as: “protecting and
enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system”. 268
There is some tension between the national character of the core
mandates of Member State CSAs and the latter’s position within EU
financial regulatory and supervisory structures–such as the ESFS and
the SSM–oriented towards cross-border goals. 269 When it comes to
the specific area of cooperation, a potential problem is that a CSA
from a Member State may be faced with a request of cooperation,
267. See, e.g., ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 42, 46; SRM Regulation, supra
note 135, art. 47.
268. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, Part 1A, Chapter 1, § 1D(1).
269. On the potential conflicts between EU and national mandates for financial sector
supervisors see Daniel C. Hardy, A European Mandate for Financial Sector Supervisors in the
EU, 21-22 (IMF Working Paper No. 09/5, 2009).
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whose compliance with would advance EU-wide objectives of
financial supervision to the detriment of that Member State’s
supervisory mandates. Although the principle of supremacy of EU
law ordinarily requires a national mandate that conflicts with a duty
of cooperation set by EU law to be set aside, 270 a CSA may be
nonetheless incentivized to refuse cooperation or provide an
incomplete cooperation to maximize its compliance with its domestic
mandates.
The accountability relationships within which CSAs operate are
critical to understanding how CSAs balance the various mandates,
duties, and interests at stake in a particular cooperation context.
Although the post-crisis overhaul on EU financial services regulation
and supervision incorporates some forms of multi-level transnational
accountability–for example an ESA may hold a CSA to account
through the binding mediation mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs
Regulations–, the account principals with the power to call and/or
hold CSAs to account are largely domestic actors. For example, the
power to appoint and dismiss the heads of CSAs lies with
governments and/or parliaments in each Member State. Similarly, the
creation, abolition and funding of CSAs depends on decisions made
by political institutions in the jurisdictions of the CSAs concerned.271
In addition, the accountability of CSAs at the national level is
essentially determined by the extent to which they accomplish their
mandates, 272 which tend to have a marked national character. Owing
to the predominantly domestic nature of both the mandates and
accountability of the Member State CSAs, when these CSAs are faced
with cooperation requests in which domestic interests are at stake,
they may have an incentive to prioritize the maximization of such
interests rather than the broader goals embraced by EU law
cooperation duties or mandates. 273 This may be particularly true when
270. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 285 (4th ed. 2016).
271. Donato Masciandaro, Maria J. Nieto & Marc Quintyn, Will They Sing the Same
Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors, in
HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 509-11 (Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro eds., 2011).
272. Iglesias-Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 15. On the importance of clear mandates for
ensuring accountability see Eva Hüpkes et al ., Accountability Arrangements for Financial
Sector Regulators, 3 (IMF Economic Issues No. 39, 2006).
273 . In the early stages of the global financial crisis, CSAs’ actions driven by the
protection of national interests sometimes had distortive effects on international capital flows.
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CSAs are not properly insulated from undue political pressure and
stakeholder interferences in their respective Member States.
VIII. THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CRISIS, BREXIT, AND THE
FUTURE OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
From the outset, the EU single market for financial services has
developed through a process of incremental integration. The Single
European Act, the FSAP, the Lamfalussy and de Larosiére
architectures, the Banking Union, and the Capital Markets Union274
represent steps of such a process, which has led to increasing degrees
of regulatory and supervisory convergence as well as greater
centralization of decision-making at the EU level. 275 The various
crises that the European Union has been facing since the year 2008
do, nevertheless, raise some concerns about the future, scope, and
pace of the process of EU financial services integration.
On the one side, the financial, euro, and sovereign debt crises,
and their effects on the EU economy, have reduced the trust of
citizens in the European Union 276 and led to a decline of support of
the process of EU integration. 277 Likewise, disagreements between
An example was asset ring-fencing in the UK and Germany in response to the Icelandic
Banks’ crisis and Lehman’s default, respectively. See Stijn Claessens, The Financial Crisis
and Financial Nationalism, in EFFECTIVE CRISIS RESPONSE AND OPENNESS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM 269-70 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2009).
274. The Capital Markets Union is a plan that was adopted by the Commission in
September 2015. Its main goal is to create a single EU capital market by 2019. The focus of
the Capital Markets Union Plan is on, inter alia, the promotion of mechanisms of direct
finance and cross-border capital flows –see Commission, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets
Union, COM (2015) 468 final.
275. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne & Elizabeth Howell, The Creation of a European Capital
Market, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE EU’S INTERNAL MARKET (Panos
Koutrakos & Jukka Snell eds., 2017); Commission, Feedback Statement on the Public
Consultation on the Operations of the European Supervisory Authorities Having Taken Place
from 21 March to 16 May 2017 (June 20, 2017), at 5, https://ec.europa.eu/info/
sites/info/files/2017-esas-operations-summary-of-responses_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8VQLBSR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
276 . See, e.g., Chase Foster & Jeffry Frieden, Crisis of Trust: Socio-Economic
Determinants of Europeans’ Confidence in Government, 18 EUR. UNION POLITICS 511,
512 (2017).
277. See, e.g., Vivien A. Schmidt, The Eurozone’s Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can
the EU Rebuild Public Trust and Support for European Economic Integration?, 7 (Directorate-
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Member States regarding responses to these crises–for example,
Germany supports austerity and structural reforms while Greece
opposes them–have led to greater polarization and tensions. 278 In
addition, the post-crisis trend of centralization of financial regulatory,
supervisory, and, more generally, executive powers at the EU level279
has not been equally welcomed by all Member States. 280 On the other
side, the EU’s legitimacy and political crises have been magnified by
Member States’ diverging approaches to core areas of EU policy,
such as migration and security, which have accentuated internal
frictions within the European Union.281

General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Economy Discussion Paper No. 15,
2015).
278. See, e.g., Klaus Armingeon & Skyler Cranmer, Position-Taking in the Euro Crisis,
24 J. OF EUR. PUB. POLICY 1, 2 (2017); Alastair Macdonald & Jan Strupczewski, Who Rules?
Euro Zone Budget Tensions Surface, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-eurozone-budgets-supervisor/who-rules-euro-zone-budget-tensions-surfaceidUSKBN13C22R [https://perma.cc/MR6C-QJJF] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
279. For examples of this kind of centralization, see Stefano Micossi, How the EZ Crisis
is Permanently Changing EU Institutions (Centre for Economic Policy Research Policy Insight
No. 65, 2013).
280. For example, the United Kingdom has long been a strong opponent of shifting
decision-making power from national bodies to EU bodies, such as the shift made by the ESFS
–see, e.g., Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the
European Union, 17 NEW POL. ECON. 515, 525 (2012); see also United Kingdom v. European
Parliament & European Council, Case C-270/12 [2014] ECR I-0, ¶ 101, http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dc90808aa4aa2d419ba46b9df567a1b8d7.
e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyNaxr0?text=&docid=140965&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mod
e=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1322385 [https://perma.cc/7FED-ZYCY] (archived Mar.
8, 2018) (rejecting the UK’s challenge to the constitutionality of the powers of ESMA in
respect of short-selling bans); United Kingdom v. European Central Bank [ECB], Case T496/11, 2015, ¶ 110, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid
=162667&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1323584
[https://perma.cc/VLQ5-EAPM] (archived Mar. 8, 2018) (accepting the UK’s argument that
the ECB lacked the power to impose requirements regarding the location of Central
Counterparty Clearing Houses (“CCPs”)). Likewise, the German Federal Financial
Supervision Authority (“BaFin”) also voiced concerns over the centralization of supervisory
powers in the SSM –see Domenico Lombardi & Manuela Moschella, Domestic Preferences
and European Banking Supervision: Germany, Italy and the Single Supervisory Mechanism,
39 W. EUR. POL. 462, 473 (2016).
281. See generally, Gabriela Baczynska, No Compromise in Sight, EU Ministers at Odds
over Immigration, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europemigrants-eu/no-compromise-in-sight-eu-ministers-at-odds-over-immigration-idUSKBN13D1A
F [https://perma.cc/G35S-5YMR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018); Francois Murphy & Isla Binnie,
Austria Says to Control Migrants on Italy Border, Rome Protests, REUTERS (July 4, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-austria-italy/austria-says-to-control-
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One of the manifestations of the EU’s various crises has been the
rise of in popularity of political parties that oppose EU integration,
notably in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. 282 Another
more dramatic outcome was the decision by the United Kingdom to
leave the European Union. 283 In addition, at the EU level, the
Commission and the Council have been mulling over a multi-speed
European Union with different degrees and speeds of integration
across Member States.284
A. The EU-UK Supervisory Relationship after Brexit
Brexit raises important questions about the future of financial
integration and supervisory cooperation in Europe. The United
Kingdom is one of the main international financial centers and it hosts
some of the largest financial entities from the EU internal market. 285
The PRA and the FCA–as well as their predecessors–have played a
central role in shaping EU financial services regulation and
supervision. 286 Brexit will transform the nature of the relationships
between the CSAs in the European Union and those in the United
Kingdom. The position of the United Kingdom in this new framework
will largely depend on whether the negotiations between the
European Union and the United Kingdom result in a “soft” or a
“hard” Brexit.

migrants-on-italy-border-rome-protests-idUSKBN19P1B5 [https://perma.cc/NGT3-CAMU]
(archived Mar. 8, 2018).
282. See Benjamin Dodman, France, Germany and the Netherlands: The Elections that
Could Derail the EU in 2017, FRANCE 24 (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.france24.com/en/
20161230-eu-elections-2017-le-pen-fillon-wilders-immigration-france-germany-netherlands
[https://perma.cc/N5DU-3HR5] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
283. The majority of the votes in the EU referendum on June 23, 2016 supported Brexit.
For an analysis of the results of the EU referendum, see Elise Uberoi, European Union
Referendum 2016 (House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP 7639, 2016).
284. See infra, Section VIII.B.
285. See, e.g., CITY OF LONDON CORPORATION, LONDON: EUROPE AND THE WORLD’S
FINANCIAL CENTRE (2014); Simeon Djankov, The City of London after Brexit, 5-10 (London
School of Economics, Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 762, 2017).
286. See generally, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, SHAPING LEGISLATION: UK
ENGAGEMENT IN EU FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY-MAKING (2016) (summarizing case
studies of the influence of the United Kingdom on five recent EU financial services laws).
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In a soft Brexit scenario, the United Kingdom would keep its
membership in the European Economic Association (“EEA”)287 and,
consequently, companies established in the United Kingdom would
be able to maintain access to the single market for financial services
in the European Union through the single passport. 288 Under this
framework, the United Kingdom would be subject to EU financial
markets legislation 289 and, therefore, to the corresponding cooperation
duties vis-à-vis other CSAs and the ESAs. With respect to the
position of the United Kingdom within the ESFS, the representatives
of the PRA and the FCA would become non-voting members of the
Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs. 290 When it comes to supervisory
cooperation disputes, CSAs in the United Kingdom would be subject
to the mediation mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations;
however, only the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”)
Surveillance Authority, not the ESAs, would have the authority to
287. Eilis Ferran, The UK as a Third Country Actor in EU Financial Services
Regulation, 2 (University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper No. 47/2016, 2016).
288. Under the single passport rights, financial entities authorized in a European
Economic Association (“EEA”) Member State have the right to provide services in other EEA
Member States without additional authorizations. See European Parliament, Briefing on
Understanding Equivalence and the Single Passport in Financial Services: Third-Country
Access to the Single Market (PE 599.267, 2017), at 3, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData
/etudes/BRIE/2017/599267/EPRS_BRI(2017)599267_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV2X-CR3L]
(archived Mar. 8, 2018).
289. The EEA Agreement extends the Single Market freedoms to EEA-European Free
Trade Association (“EFTA”) countries, currently Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, thus
subjecting these countries to the EU internal market laws. See European Parliament, Briefing
Note: Overview of EU Rules Applicable to EEA/EFTA Countries in Financial Services,
Competition and Taxation (PE 408.579, 2008), at 2.
290. The ESAs Regulations were incorporated into the EEA Agreement by: Decision of
the EEA Joint Committee No. 199/2016 of 30 September 2016 Amending Annex IX
(Financial Services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/276], 2016 O.J. L 46/4 (incorporating the
EBA Regulation); Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 200/2016 of 30 September 2016
Amending Annex IX (Financial Services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/277], 2016 O.J. L
46/13 (incorporating the EIOPA Regulation); and Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No.
201/2016 of 30 September 2016 Amending Annex IX (Financial Services) to the EEA
Agreement [2017/278], 2016 O.J. L 46/22 (incorporating the ESMA Regulation). The heads of
the relevant CSAs of EEA-EFTA Member States are non-voting members of the Boards of
Supervisors of the ESAs–see, e.g., EEA Consolidated Version of Regulation (EU) No.
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 Establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Amending Decision No.
716/2009/EC and Repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (2010 O.J. L 331/12) as
Adapted for the Purposes of the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No.
199/2016 of 30 September 2016 (2017 O.J. L 46/4), art. 40.1(b) [hereinafter EEA
Consolidated Regulation No. 1093/2010].
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issue a binding mediation decision against these CSAs. 291 The
likelihood of the UK’s membership in the EEA post-Brexit is, in
principle, low 292 because membership would imply a series of
commitments, such as acceptance of the EU’s four freedoms and
indirect judicial oversight by the CJEU, 293 which clash with the UK
Conservative Party’s manifesto. 294
Regarding the possibility of UK financial entities relocating to
the European Union to maintain access to the single market for
financial services, an opinion issued by ESMA in May 2017 295
suggests that authorizations issued to relocating entities will be
subject to strict conditionality 296 and CSAs of the Member States will
be expected to monitor the real reasons these entities move to the
European Union and to “reject any relocation request creating letterbox entities where, for instance, extensive use of outsourcing and
delegation is foreseen with the intention of benefitting from an EU
passport, while essentially performing all substantial activities or
functions outside the EU27.” 297
In a hard Brexit scenario, 298 namely one in which the United
Kingdom does not maintain membership in the EEA and there is no
291. See, e.g., EEA Consolidated Regulation No. 1093/2010, supra note 290, art. 19.3.
292. There are some discussions about the effects of Brexit on the UK’s membership in
the EEA; specifically, whether after leaving the European Union, the United Kingdom would
retain its membership in the EEA, or if, on the contrary, it would cease being an EEA
contracting party. See, e.g., ALLEN & OVERY, IMPLICATIONS OF EEA MEMBERSHIP OUTSIDE
THE EU - DIFFERENT NAME, SAME GAME? 7 (2016), http://www.allenovery.com/BrexitLaw/Documents/Macro/EU/AO_BrexitLaw_-_EEA_Membership_Jul_2016.PDF
[https://perma.cc/9KUB-DKQW] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
293 . Agreement on the European Economic Area, arts. 6-7, 2016 O.J. L 1 E/3
[hereinafter EEA Agreement]; see also HOGAN LOVELLS, THE UK AND THE EEA AFTER
BREXIT
(2017),
http://www.hoganlovellsbrexit.com/_uploads/downloads/11075_CM_
BREXIT-EEA_INFO_E-zbmct.pdf [https://perma.cc/K559-CFG3] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
294. CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY, MANIFESTO 2017: FORWARD, TOGETHER
35-36 (2017). At the time of writing this paper, the Conservative Party was the UK’s ruling
party. See also Jim Edwards, Theresa May’s Silent Decision to Leave the EEA is Setting Up
Britain for the Worst of all Possible Brexit Deals, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/theresa-may-eea-britain-disastrous-brexit-deal-2017-1.
295. ESMA, General Principles to Support Supervisory Convergence in the Context of
the United Kingdom Withdrawing from the European Union (ESMA42-110-433) (May 31,
2017).
296. In areas relating to, among others, the governance, operations, and outsourcing and
delegation agreements of the relocating financial entities. Id. at 3-6.
297. Id. at 5.
298. Various commentators see hard Brexit as a highly likely scenario –see, e.g., John
Springford, Why a Hard Brexit Looks Likely, 110 CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM BULLETIN
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alternative agreement giving it similar rights, 299 the United Kingdom
would become a third-country for regulatory and supervisory
purposes. 300 In such a scenario, the UK’s access to the single market
for financial services would depend on the issuance of an equivalence
decision by the Commission 301 finding the financial regulatory and
supervisory regime in the United Kingdom to be equivalent to that in
the European Union. 302 The access rights granted under the
equivalence framework are, however, much more restricted than those
available through the single passport. 303 For instance, equivalence can
only be requested by third-countries and granted by the Commission
when an EU financial law allows for such possibility, and only for the
specific purposes stipulated in such law. Moreover, a decision on
equivalence can be unilaterally withdrawn by the Commission. 304
Regarding financial supervision, the UK CSAs would no longer be
subject to supervisory cooperation duties required under EU law; nor
would they form part of the ESFS and its supervisory cooperation
instruments. More generally, Brexit, particularly its “hard” version,
will cause greater divergence between the EU law and UK law, 305
which may have a potential impact on the ability of CSAs from both
sides of the Channel to cooperate with each other.

1, 2-3 (2016); Martin Wolf, Business Should Assume a Hard Brexit, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan.
12, 2017). A survey conducted before the start of the Brexit negotiations between the
European Union and the United Kingdom showed that among non-British Europeans there is
wide support for a hard Brexit. Jon Henley & Pamela Duncan, Two-thirds of Europeans
Believe EU Should Take Hard Line on Brexit – Poll, THE GUARDIAN (June 19, 2017, 7:01
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/20/two-thirds-europeans-believe-eu-hardline-brexit-poll [https://perma.cc/WY67-2JVQ] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
299. Ferran, supra note 287, at 41.
300. Id. at 42.
301. Karel Lanoo, EU Financial Market Access After Brexit, 51 INTERECONOMICS 255,
258-260 (2016).
302. On the concept of equivalence in financial services see European Parliament, supra
note 288, at 2 and Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on EU equivalence
decisions in financial services policy: an assessment, SWD (2017) 102 final.
303. See, e.g., Gavin Finch & John Glover, Goodbye Passport, Hello Equivalence?
Brexit Banks Compromise, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
professional/blog/goodbye-passport-hello-equivalence-brexit-banks-compromise/
[https://
perma.cc/VG22-JP73] (archived Mar, 8, 2018).
304. European Parliament, Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking Legislation (PE
587.369, 2017), at 2.
305. See, e.g., WILLIAM WRIGHT, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON EUROPEAN
CAPITAL MARKETS: A QUALITATIVE SURVEY OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS 15 (2016).
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In areas of systemic importance for the financial system, Brexit
may require the European Union to redefine its relationship with the
United Kingdom in order to address potential threats to the stability of
the EU financial system. One area of regulation that will likely need
this redefining is post-trading. 306 In June 2017, the Commission
proposed a new regulatory framework 307 for third-country Central
Counterparty Clearing Houses (“CCPs”) 308 aimed at strengthening
their supervision to mitigate systemic risks in the European Union.309
Due to the central role that CCPs play in the functioning of financial
systems, their failure could have a systemic impact. 310 Recognized
third-country CCPs clear a significant amount of financial instruments
denominated in Euro and other currencies of the Member States.311
As a result, disruptions affecting recognized third-country CCPs may
have a major effect in the stability of the EU financial system. 312 In
the Commission’s view, the supervisory cooperation arrangements
embraced by the equivalence regime did not properly guarantee
robust supervision of recognized non-EU CCPs:
after a third-country CCP has been recognized [sic], ESMA has
encountered difficulties in accessing information from the CCP,
306 . Post-trading primarily refers to two functions: clearing and settlement. For an
overview of post-trading see GIOVANNINI GROUP, CROSS-BORDER CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 4-6 (2001).
307. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 as regards the
procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of CCPs and requirements for the
recognition of third-country CCPs, COM (2017) 331 final [hereinafter Commission’s
Proposal].
308. One of the main functions performed by CCPs is novation. Novation refers to the
substitution of a contract between a buyer and a seller of securities for two new contracts, one
between the buyer and the CCP and another between the seller and the CCP. By interposing
itself between the buyer and the seller and guaranteeing the performance of the obligations of
the parties in case of default by any of them, the CCP mitigates counterparty risk. On the role
of CCPs in risk mitigation see Douglas D. Evanoff et al., Policymakers, Researchers, and
Practitioners Discuss the Role of Central Counterparties, 30 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 2, 3-4 (2006); Kirsi Ripatti, Central Counterparty
Clearing: Constructing a Framework for Evaluation of Risks and Benefits (Bank of Finland
Discussion Paper No. 30/2004, 2004).
309. Commission Press Release, IP/17/1568 (June 13, 2017).
310. Amandeep Rehlon & Dan Nixon, Central Counterparties: What Are They, Why Do
They Matter and How Does the Bank Supervise Them?, 53 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 147, 147
(2013); Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 4.
311. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 5.
312. Id. at 5-6.
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in conducting on-site inspections of the CCP and in sharing
information with the relevant EU regulators, supervisors and
central banks. As a result, there is a risk that third country CCP
practices and/or adjustments to risk management models go
undetected and/or unaddressed, which may have important
financial-stability implications for the EU entities. 313

The Commission’s Proposal specifically acknowledges the risks
posed by Brexit. The United Kingdom hosts some of the main CCPs
clearing euro-denominated transactions, such as London Clearing
House Limited (“LCH”). 314 Consequently, the UK’s withdrawal from
the European Union, would lead to a major increase in the volume of
transactions being cleared in third-countries and subjected to lesser
degrees of EU oversight. 315
Under the proposed reform, ESMA would be tasked with
carrying out assessments on the systemic importance of third-country
CCPs for the financial stability of the European Union. 316 These
assessments may determine, either that a CCP is or likely to become
systemically important (“Tier-2 CCPs”), 317 or that a CCP is neither
systemically important nor likely to become so (“Tier-1 CCPs”). 318
Tier-1 CCPs would be subject to the general equivalence and
recognition regime. 319 Tier-2 CCPs would be further divided in two
categories, which would each receive different regulatory treatment.
On the one hand, ESMA may consider a Tier-2 CCP to be
systemically important; such CCP would be under a special
regulatory regime where, in addition to compliance with the general
equivalence conditions, it must fulfill additional requirements, such as
the EMIR prudential rules applicable to CCPs in the European
Union. 320 On the other hand, ESMA may conclude that a CCP is of
substantial systemic importance; 321 this would apply to CCPs that,
because of their particular features (e.g. their concentration of
313. Id. at 5.
314. See Philip Stafford & Rachel Toplensky, EU Outlines 3 Options for London’s Euro
Clearing Business, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 4, 2017).
315. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 6.
316. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24, recital 29.
317. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24; and proposed art. 25.2a of EMIR.
318. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24; and proposed art. 25.2(e) of EMIR.
319. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24.
320. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24-25; and proposed art. 25.2b(a) of
EMIR.
321. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 25; and proposed art. 25.2c of EMIR.
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clearing operations) pose major risks to the stability of the European
Union or to one or more Member States; 322 the Commission’s
Proposal deems the regulatory and supervisory arrangements
embraced by the third-country equivalence-recognition regime to be
unsuitable for this type of CCPs and that, therefore, they should not
have access to it; 323 ESMA may propose to the Commission that a
CCP deemed to be of substantial systemic importance is not
recognized; if the Commission adopts an implementing act to that
effect, then the recognition regime would be dis-applied, with the
result that the third-country Tier-2 CCP concerned could only provide
services within the EU single market by relocating to the European
Union. 324 The criteria that ESMA will use to determine the systemic
importance of CCPs include their size, the value of the transactions
cleared in each EU currency, and the impact that their failure would
have on the EU financial system. 325 Consequently, the proposed
regime might result in some UK-based CCPs that play a central role
in the clearing of euro-denominated transactions, such as LCH, being
forced to move their clearing business to the European Union or else
lose their access to the EU single market.326
Overall, the proposed reform would result in greater
centralization of supervisory functions pertaining to third-country
CCPs at the EU level. Notably, ESMA would be entrusted with the
supervision of both Tier-1 and Tier-2 CCPs, particularly with respect
to ongoing compliance with the conditions for recognition. 327 In
addition, some of the EMIR’s proposed amendments are aimed at
fostering supervisory cooperation by, for example, requiring that “the
cooperation arrangements between ESMA and the relevant competent
authorities of equivalent CCP third-country regimes . . . be effective
in practice.” 328 The Commission’s Proposal also stipulates that
equivalence and recognition will be conditional on the effective
Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 25-26.
Id.; and proposed art. 25.2c of EMIR.
Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 26; and proposed art. 25.2c of EMIR.
Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24; and proposed art. 25.2a of EMIR.
Huw Jones, LCH Urges EU to Avoid Forced Relocation of Euro Clearing,
REUTERS (June 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-clearing/lch-urges-euto-avoid-forced-relocation-of-euro-clearing-idUKKBN18Y1FR [https://perma.cc/SQ3Z-3RZ9]
(archived Mar. 8, 2018).
327. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 26; and proposed art. 25.b of EMIR.
328. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 26; and proposed art. 25.7 of EMIR.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326 .
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cooperation by third-country CSAs. If these CSAs fail to cooperate in
good faith with ESMA or other EU supervisors, the Commission can
decide to revoke an equivalence decision. 329 The Commission’s
Proposal has been complemented by the ECB’s Governing Council
Recommendation of 22 June 2017 to Amend Article 22 of the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank. 330 Under this proposed reform, CCPs would be put
under the ECB’s regulatory and supervisory remit. 331 The ECB’s
proposal largely builds on the CJEU’s decision in Case T-496/11
regarding the UK’s challenge to the power of the ECB to regulate
CCPs and, notably, to its competence to impose location requirements
under the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework. 332 The CJEU
upheld the UK’s view but, at the same time, acknowledged that the
ECB could request the EU legislature to grant the ECB the power to
regulate CCPs if the ECB deemed such power necessary to the proper
performance of its tasks. 333 The proposed amendment to Article 22 of
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks would result in
additional centralization of CCP clearing regulation and supervision
at the EU level, with the ECB playing a central role in the oversight,
not only of EU CCPs, but also of third-country CCPs that clear eurodenominated transactions. 334 The ECB has indicated that it will take a
strict approach to the recognition of third-country CCPs in order to
preserve financial stability in the European Union. 335 Consequently,
the formulation of this proposal in the midst of the Brexit talks has
329. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, recital 26.
330. Recommendation for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank (ECB/2017/18) (presented by the European Central Bank), 2017 O.J.
C 212/14.
331. The amended version of Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks (“ESCB”) would read as follows: “The ECB and national central banks may provide
facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and
payment systems, and clearing systems for financial instruments, within the Union and with
other countries.” Id. art. 1.
332. ECB, EUROSYSTEM OVERSIGHT POLICY FRAMEWORK (2011).
333. United Kingdom v. European Central Bank [ECB], Case T-496/11, 2015, ¶ 109,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=162667&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1323584 [https://perma.cc/Y5X8-NBX6]
(archived Mar. 8, 2018).
334. See ECB, supra note 330, recital 7.
335. See Benoît Cœuré, European CCPs after Brexit:. Speech at the Global Financial
Markets Association (June 20, 2017).
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raised concerns among UK’s policy-makers and financial industry
actors, who foresee a potential threat to a key sector of the UK’s
financial industry. 336
In the post-Brexit scenario, the incentives of CSAs from the
European Union and the United Kingdom to cooperate with each
other will largely be determined by the degrees of financial
interdependence between the European Union and the United
Kingdom. A first potential scenario is one where the United Kingdom
would lose relevance as a European financial center. This may
happen, for instance, if there is an increase in financial outflows from
the United Kingdom to the European Union in combination with a
decrease in financial inflows from the European Union to the United
Kingdom. 337 In such a case, the scope of cooperation between the
European Union and the United Kingdom would be more limited. A
second potential scenario is one where the United Kingdom retains its
relevance as a European financial center and the high degrees of
financial interdependence between the European Union and the
United Kingdom are maintained.338 In such a second scenario, CSAs
would have incentives to develop arrangements that guarantee an
efficient supervisory cooperation, even in absence of a strong
framework of binding cooperation duties.

336. See Alessandro Speciale, ECB Raises Brexit Heat with Bid for Power Over Euro
Clearing,
BLOOMBERG
MARKETS
(June
23,
2017,
2:43
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-23/ecb-bids-for-power-over-euro-clearingas-brexit-debate-heats-up [https://perma/cc/692S-E3UT] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
337. Post-referendum data suggests that Brexit may have a negative impact on UK-based
British stock market funds. See Simon Bowers, UK Investment Funds Suffered £5.7bn
Outflows After Brexit Vote, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2016, 2:43 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/23/uk-investment-funds-suffered-5-billionpound-outflows-after-brexit-vote [https://perma.cc/35MS-NV4S] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
338. Some commentators argue that, owing to the high interdependencies between the
EU and UK financial systems, a Brexit deal that hinders the position of the City of London,
would be negative for the European Union as well. See Daniel Boffey, EU Will Lose Out from
Bad Brexit Deal on City, Says Leaked Report, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2017, 6:48 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/feb/01/eu-brexit-deal-city-leaked-reporteuropean-parliament-article-50 [https://perma.cc/63T6-VGVP] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
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B. The Prospect of a Multi-Speed European Union and its Impact on
Supervisory Cooperation
The EU political crisis, which was to a certain degree
exacerbated by the Brexit vote, 339 received mixed policy reactions.
Whereas some proposals point in the direction of greater integration
and centralization of financial supervision at the EU level, others
might lead to the coexistence of mixed degrees of integration within
the single market for financial services.
On the one side, the EU economic and political crises have
increased awareness within the EU-27 about the need to advance the
process of capital markets integration to support the EU economy. 340
The Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan,
published by the Commission on June 8, 2017, acknowledges the
instrumental role that supervision plays in the proper functioning of
capital markets and suggests the need to move towards greater
integration of the EU financial supervisory framework. 341 The
reforms put forward by the Mid-Term Review include a future
revision of the powers of the ESAs and, particularly, of ESMA aimed
at fostering their role in EU financial supervision and broadening the
areas of the financial system within their direct supervisory control.342
These reforms, which would lead to more centralization of financial
supervision in the European Union, build on the plan for a Financial
Union 343 proposed by the Five President’s Report published in June
2015. 344 The pillars of the Financial Union project are the Banking
Union and the Capital Markets Union. 345 The Five President’s Report

339 . See, e.g., European Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm. [ESFRC], Europe Under
Threat: The Political Dynamics of Brexit Interacting with Weakness in the European Financial
System, Statement No. 42 (Sept. 16, 2016).
340. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
on the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan, COM (2017) 292 final, at
8 [hereinafter Mid-Term Review].
341. Id.
342. Id. at 8, 10-11.
343. Id. at 8.
344. Commission, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (June 22, 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4AD8-ZFL8] (archived Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Five President’s Report].
345. Id. at 11-12.
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envisaged the future creation of a Single European Capital Markets
Supervisor for the Capital Markets Union. 346
On the other side, the idea of a multi-speed Europe, which has
been gaining force since the Rome Summit of March 2017, 347 raises
some questions about the future of financial integration and
supervisory cooperation in the European Union. In the White Paper
on the Future of Europe, published on March 1, 2017, 348 the
Commission presented five potential scenarios regarding the future of
the European Union. These scenarios, which ranged from “less EU”
to “more EU,” 349 reflected different political views about the process
of EU integration. One of the pathways suggested by the Commission
was “the European Union allows willing Member States to do more
together in specific areas.” 350 This idea, which received mixed
degrees of support from Member States, 351 was embraced by the
leaders of the EU-27, the Council, the Parliament, and the
Commission in the Rome Declaration of March 25, 2017. 352 There is
some uncertainty regarding whether and to what extent the single
346. Id. at 12.
347. European Council Meeting of 25 March 2017.
348. Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for
the EU27 by 2025, COM (2017) 2025, at 15-25 [hereinafter White Paper on the Future of
Europe].
349. The proposed scenarios were the following: (i) “Carrying on;” (ii) “Nothing but the
single market;” (iii) “Those who want more do more;” (iv) “Doing less more efficiently;” and,
(v) “Doing much more together.” For an overview of the policies embraced by each of these
scenarios see id. at 29.
350. Id. at 20-21.
351. Whereas France, Germany, Italy, and Spain supported the idea of a multi-speed
Europe –see Aline Robert, ‘Big Four’ Call for New European Dynamic, Multi-Speed EU,
EURACTIV (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/big-four-call-fornew-european-dynamic-multi-speed-eu/ [https://perma.cc/ZN37-RAQW] (archived Mar. 8,
2018)–, the Visegrad Group, namely Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, opposed
it, arguing that it could lead to a disintegration of the Single Market, the Schengen area, and
the European Union –see Polish Presidency of the Visegrad Group, Joint Statement of the
Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, Strong Europe – Union of Action and Trust: Input
to Rome Declaration 2017 (2017), https://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrum/aktualne/JointStatement-of-the-Heads-of-Governments-of-the-V4-Countries-_Strong-Europe-_-Union-ofAction-and-Trust_-Input-to-Rome-Declaration-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5ZP-V2JG]
(archived Mar. 8, 2018).
352. In this respect, the signatories of the Rome Declaration agreed on the following
text: “We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in
the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door
open to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible.” –Council of the
European Union Press Release, 149/17 (Mar. 25, 2017).
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market for financial services would be included within the scope of a
multi-speed European Union. The White Paper on the Future of
Europe does not include the financial sector among the areas that
would operate under multi-tier arrangements. 353 In addition, after the
Rome Summit, EU policy-makers have made a series of decisions,
such as the above-referred proposals to strengthen ESMA’s powers in
the field of post-trading, that encompass an underlying notion of
single-speed European Union and of advancing, en bloc, in the
process of integration of the financial supervisory framework.
There are policy arguments justifying a same-speed approach to
financial regulation and supervision. Notably, the creation of different
speeds or tiers of financial integration in the European Union could
hinder the process of development and consolidation of the single
market for financial services. The coexistence of various levels of
supervisory integration with asymmetries in the extent and scope of
cooperation duties depending on the Member States concerned could
result in distortions in the quality and consistency of EU financial
supervision. Indeed, a multi-speed internal market for financial
services would be contrary to the objective of “ensuring common
implementation of the rules for the financial sector and more
centralized [sic] supervisory enforcement” 354 and, more generally, to
the process of construction of a Financial Union.
IX. CONCLUSION
The post-financial crisis regulatory overhaul has dramatically
transformed supervisory relationships in the European Union. The
new system is based on a greater centralization of powers at the EU
level, with EU bodies and institutions, such as the ESAs and the ECB,
playing a key role in both the exercise and coordination of financial
supervision. Nonetheless, the EU financial supervision architecture
remains largely decentralized and the CSAs of the Member States,
each with their own, and often dissimilar, structures, mandates and
powers, carry out important day-to-day supervision of their own
financial markets, actors, and institutions. One of the challenges
353. White Paper on the Future of Europe, supra note 348, at 20-21.
354. Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary
Union, COM (2017) 291, at 20.
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brought about by this new complex, multi-level architecture is how to
articulate an efficient coordination, interaction, and cooperation
between the actors entrusted with supervisory responsibilities at its
various levels. The response of EU law has been threefold.
In the first place, there has been a process of increasing
harmonization of the rules on supervisory cooperation. EU Directives
and Regulations in the financial field have developed a rather
comprehensive catalogue of cooperation duties, reducing the
discretion of Member States in the interpretation of the nature and
scope of supervisory cooperation obligations.
Second, the mechanisms for solving supervisory cooperation
disputes among CSAs have been improved and strengthened.
Notably, the allocation of binding mediation powers to the ESAs visà-vis CSAs, albeit subject to important limitations, constitutes an
important change of paradigm compared to the soft-law nature of the
Lamfalussy Committees’ mediation decisions. The threat of
deployment of those powers may create incentives for CSAs to
comply with their cooperation duties, so as to avoid the potential costs
of an ESA’s binding intervention in a supervisory cooperation
dispute.
Third, post-crisis EU laws have broadened the catalogue of
minimum supervisory powers at the disposal of CSAs of the Member
States, hence increasing their ability to fulfill requests of cooperation
from fellow CSAs. Likewise, the ESFS and the Banking Union have
embraced a transnationalization of supervisory mandates whereby
Member State CSAs are bound to the accomplishment, not only of
national objectives, but also of EU-wide supervisory targets.
Despite the advancement of EU financial services integration
and supervisory convergence brought by the post-crisis regulatory
overhaul, the ESFS, and the Banking Union, this Article has
identified and analyzed important obstacles for an efficient
supervisory cooperation in the European Union.
First, EU financial laws still encompass exceptions to the duty to
cooperate that may be subject to biased interpretations and
opportunistic uses by CSAs in order to refuse cooperation in
particular instances. More generally, the analysis has shown that the
content and scope of supervisory cooperation duties as defined by EU
law often lack clarity and precision. This carries the risk of diverging
interpretations by CSAs across the European Union and,
consequently, of supervisory dissent.

666

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:589

Second, within the ESFS, the use of instruments for the
settlement of disagreements between CSAs is subject to strict
conditions that considerably limit their applicability in cases of
supervisory cooperation disputes. Moreover, the activation of the
ESAs’ mediation mechanism may create tensions and hinder trust
between CSAs and, consequently, affect their future cooperation.
Regarding disputes between an ESA and a CSA, the ESFS implicitly
vests resolution power in the ESAs, hence giving rise to potential
conflicts of interest.
Third, notwithstanding the increasing degrees of harmonization
of supervisory powers across the European Union, there still are
important differences in the competences of CSAs in various Member
States. This may, in turn, affect their ability to fulfill cooperation
requests. Likewise, whereas the ESFS and the Banking Union have
instituted transnational supervisory mandates, CSAs from the
Member States operate under accountability structures that are
primarily domestic. This may incentivize CSAs to pursue the
prioritization of national interests in detriment of the accomplishment
of EU-wide targets.
Finally, the EU political crisis, Brexit –which may result in the
United Kingdom becoming a third-country for supervisory purposes–
and the prospects of a multi-speed European Union with various
degrees of integration, raise some concerns about the future of the
process of EU financial integration and supervisory cooperation
within the single market for financial services.
In spite of these various crisis fronts, and of the limitations of
the current EU legal and regulatory frameworks in dealing with the
complexity of the financial supervision architecture, capital
markets is an area where the process of integration has been
advancing steadily. Brexit has indeed reinforced the determination
of EU policy-makers to furthering such process; as put by
Commissioner Dombrovskis: “As we face the departure of the
largest EU financial centre, we are committed to stepping up our
efforts to further strengthen and integrate the EU capital
markets.” 355 Moreover, the EU institutions consider the
enhancement of supervisory cooperation and convergence within
355. Commission Press Release, IP/17/1529 (June 8, 2017).
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the European Union to be a key priority in the process of future
financial reforms. For example, one of the main elements of the
Commission’s public consultation on the operations of the ESAs
related to the effectiveness of their tools and powers in fostering
supervisory convergence and cooperation across borders. 356 Also,
the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan
has highlighted the need to strengthen the powers of ESMA to
guarantee the consistency of financial supervision across the
European Union. 357 On September 20, 2017 the Commission
published a Proposal for a Regulation 358 that is largely aimed at
achieving more integrated supervision in the European Union; the
Proposal’s reforms include an strengthening of the powers of the
ESAs, a new governance structure for the ESAs less dependent on
Member States’ interests, as well as greater centralization of
financial supervision at the EU level. 359
Overall, these reforms may contribute to enhance the quality
and efficiency of supervisory cooperation in the European Union;
on the one side, by removing legal and regulatory barriers to
cooperation, they may increase the ability of CSAs to cooperate
with each other; on the other side, by supporting greater financial
integration, these reforms may help to align the interests of CSAs
and, consequently, their incentives to provide meaningful
cooperation.

356. Commission, Public Consultation on the Operations of the European Supervisory
Authorities (2017), at 7-8, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-esas-operationsconsultation-document_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC7C-EQWH] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).
357. Mid-Term Review, supra note 340, at 8.
358. See Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs, supra note 214.
359. See Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Reinforcing integrated supervision to
strengthen Capital Markets Union and financial integration in a changing environment, COM
(2017) 542 final, at 3-10.
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